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ABSTRACT
Tensions between the principles of self-determination and sovereignty have again
reached a flashpoint in the Balkans, as Kosovo's ethnic Albanian majority has taken their
quest for self-determination via statehood to a new level. On 17 February 2008, the
Albanian-dominated legislative assembly of internationally-administered Kosovo issued
a unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia, jeopardizing the notion that
territorial sovereignty trumps all in international relations. This move followed a two-
year series of multilateral negotiations over Kosovo's final status that ultimately ended in
stalemate, with neither the Serbs nor the Kosovar Albanians reaching any mutually
acceptable solution. In the wake of the international community's failure to forge a
resolution to this nationalist conflict, several questions remain unanswered. Foremost, at
what point does the principle of self-determination apply to one group over another-
when does one's right or entitlement to self-determination take primacy over another's?
Additionally, what justifies the claims of one group to a territory over another's? At what
point, if any, does a state lose its right to territorial integrity? Most importantly, at what
point do calls for self-determination trump the fundamental right of states to preserve
themselves?
In this thesis, I argue that Kosovo is not a sui generis case, but rather that it stands
to set a broadly applicable precedent for how the international community will be
expected,to respond to other nationalist-separatist conflicts that pursue self-determination
through statehood. That is to say, the Kosovo case marks a paradigm shift for the
relationship between self-determination and sovereignty. The findings of this thesis
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suggest that the solution to the Kosovo conflict will not likely be created by third-party
mediators or great power negotiators; rather, the solution must originate from within the
conflict. If there is to be any lasting resolution, both the Serbs and the Albanians must
commit to addressing each others' interests, acknowledging each other's histories, and
making a genuine effort toward reconciliation. By contrast, if both parties continue to
speak past one another, neither will be fully satisfied with the outcome.
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CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
Tucked between the Sar Mountains and the North Albanian Alps, a landlocked
territory roughly the size of Connecticut is the world's latest stage upon which the drama
of self-determination is being played. Kosovo, at once the Balkans' oldest and freshest
nationalist-separatist conflict, stands to fundamentally alter the way that the principle of
self-determination is understood, interpreted, and applied within the international system.
The Kosovo case is marked by several key distinctions that place it in such an influential
position, most notably that Kosovo has straddled the conceptual boundary between de
facto statehood and dependent protectorate since 1999 under an unprecedented system of
neotrusteeship. This international orchestration has created a pivotal role for
multilateralism with regard to shaping what has been termed Kosovo's 'final status.' As
such, Kosovo via its future political arrangements may serve to recalibrate the balance
between 'a self-determination of peoples' and state sovereignty.
Previously, this balance was defined by the preservation of the already-existing
state taking precedence over nationalist-separatist groups' demands for statehood.
Historically regarded as the primary actor within international relations, the state has long
been respected as ultimately sovereign over its own affairs, both internal and external. As
such, the interests of nationalist-separatist groups within recognized sovereign states have
been secondary to the interests of the state itself. This standard held until the break-up of
the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s, when the international community, led by a
recently unified Germany, began to recognize the legitimacy of nationalist-separatist
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movements within the Yugoslav republics. The basis of this recognition is rooted in the
notion of self-determination, a concept that was not formally incorporated into
international relations until the aftermath of the First World War as the disintegration of
Europe's last great empires resulted in a wave of newly-created nation-states.
As a result of this aftermath, nationalities and ethnicities were, for the first time in
any significant number, afforded the opportunity to advance their collective positions as
groups within the international system. Coupled with a rise in democratization and a
popular belief that 'the people' should retain control over their own fates, group interests
were soon regarded as group rights, and thus the notion of a self-determination of peoples
became a regular part of the language of international relations. Although it is difficult to
find fault with the spirit of this notion, there is little agreement upon how self-
determination ought to be applied, and this disagreement over application brings to the
surface a host of complications-for example, who are 'the people,' and to what extent
should their claim to self-determination progress before it encroaches upon the claims
(perhaps even rights) of another people to self-determination? What justifies one group's
claim over another's? Does an objective standard exist, or is it even feasible that one
might be created?
Finally, the growing acceptance of claims to self-determination did not negate the
state's right to its own self-preservation. This introduces a most vexing predicament:
what is the proper response when calls for self-determination threaten to violate the rights
~
of a sovereign state to maintain both its territory and its people? At what point, if any,
does a state lose its right to territorial integrity? Moreover, at what point, if any at all, do
4
the claims of a people calling for self-determination trump the fundamental right of states
to preserve themselves?
Consider Kosovo, Serbia's southern province whose status presently hovers
somewhere between independent republic I and secessionist "fake state.,,2 Home to an
ethnic Albanian population that vastly outnumbers its Serbian inhabitants by a ratio of
just over 9: 1, Kosovar Albanians have long clamored for independence from Serbia. The
justification for their claims is based largely upon the notion of a right to self-
determination, in that the majority population of Kosovar Albanians claims that it has a
right to its own political existence free from minority rule. But Kosovo is also home to
Serbs and other minorities, and perhaps more importantly, Kosovo was the center of the
Medieval Serbian Empire and is also where the majority of the Serbian Orthodox
Church's holiest sites are located. Thus, Kosovo is not only the domain of a large number
of ethnic Albanians (approximately 1.8 million, roughly half the number of ethnic
Albanians living in Albania proper); it is also the very heart of the Serbian nation.
Clearly, this presents a very difficult challenge to foreign policymakers and local
inhabitants alike.
To address this challenge, it is essential that a thorough understanding of all
relevant concepts be established. Therefore, an evaluation of various historical and legal
interpretations of both self-determInation and sovereignty must precede any discussion of
I The Kosovo Assembly declared independence on 17 February 2008, proclaiming the birth of a 'Republic
ofKosovo.'
2 Shortly after Kosovo's declaration of independence, outgoing Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica
remarked, "The unilateral declaration of the fake state of Kosovo represents the final act of a policy
initiated in 1999 with NATO aggression." (Source: "Serbia's President, Prime Minister Denounce Kosovo,
West," Balkan Insight, 17 February 2008. Available at:
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/mainlnews/7965/.)
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the particulars of the Kosovo case. This thesis will proceed as follows: first, the
"""
remainder of Chapter 1 will review competing interpretations of both critical concepts
(sovereignty and self-determination), drawing from international legal documents in
addition to theoretical literature. Chapter 1 will also provide some sense of the past cases
that have led to the current debate surrounding self-determination and Kosovo.
Upon reaching an adequate understanding of the terms and precedents sufficient
to see how the Kosovo case might fit within them, a detailed discussion of the case will
follow in Chapter 2, establishing the necessary historical context that frames the ongoing
dispute. Chapter 2 will attempt to provide evidence necessary to understand the events
leading up to the dispute, and should offer the reader some relevant context surrounding
the case. At this point, it should be evident that there is no clear or simple solution to this
quandary, and Chapter 2 concludes with a discussion of how historical grievances relate
to the conflict-why Serbia has been able to invoke its right to territorial preservation,
and why Kosovar Albanians may have legitimate cause for demanding self-determination
via an independent state of Kosovo. Chapter 3 will present contemporary complications
that arise from straightforward solution to the conflict, with a particular focus on
statehood, viability, and sustainability. Furthermore, there are additional complications,
including concerns for sustainability and the protection of minorities (who, in theory,
have as much right to self-determination as do their counterparts in the majority). Finally,
Chapter 4 will conclude with a discussion of potential alternative solutions to the conflict
between sovereignty and self-determination, drawing in particular from the two-year
multilateral final status negotiations process that concluded on 10 December 2007.
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I argue that Kosovo is not a unique, isolated case, but rather that it stands to set an
original but broadly applicable precedent for how the international community3 will be
expected to respond to future nationalist-separatist conflicts in pursuit of the fulfillment
of self-determination. Further, it stands to reason that should the international community
foster, promote, or otherwise manipulate internal self-determination movements such as
Kosovo's (in cases such that the ultimate goal is recognized statehood for the breakaway
territory), the international community is violating the principle of sovereign equality by
first meddling in the internal affairs of a recognized sovereign state (in this case, Serbia),
and secondarily by promoting secession (thereby advantaging the separatist group over
the state from which it is seceding). Thus, the international community's response to the
Kosovo conflict marks a paradigm shift with regard to the balance between self-
determination and sovereignty.
COMPETING PERSPECTIVES ON SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION
Sovereignty: Origins and Interpretations
The notion of 'sovereignty' is perhaps one of the most scrutinized topics within
international relations-in fact, one could argue that questions of sovereignty underlie all
political inquiry, given that politics concerns the distribution or allocation of power, and
sovereignty is at its most basic level a right or claim to ultimate power.
The origins of most modem interpretations of sovereignty can be traced to the
1648 Peace at Westphalia (henceforth, simply'Westphalia') that signaled the end of the
Thirty Years War. Westphalia is commonly credited with establishing the basis for the
3 In this context, I am using the term 'international community' to refer to the combination of highly
influential individual states (e.g. the United States and the United Kingdom, but not Tuvalu and Vanuatu)
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modern state system (or the 'consolidation' of it, as Daniel Philpott prefers),4 from which
most discussions of sovereignty derive. Philpott evaluates the significance of Westphalia,
comparing the state to the human body: "[i]t could now be taken for granted that with
respect for the rest of the world, what happened inside this body was 'private;' there was
now such a thing as 'internal affairs' .... A new logic of necessity prevailed, by which the
interests of states became preserving their territory, their armies, and their treasure."s
Westphalia is thus a pivotal moment for the realist underpinnings of international
relations as it suggested an emergent, universal raison d'etat-the reason of the state
became the state itself, not the Catholic Church or its Holy Roman Empire (HRE). The
point at which the preservation of the state itself became a prevailing national interest is
the point at which questions of state sovereignty began to define international relations.
Given the vast amount of academic energy dedicated to developing an
understanding of sovereignty, numerous interpretations of the concept abound. One
approach is to break down sovereignty into 'internal' and 'external' components, a
distinction that is useful in that it adds flexibility to the applications of sovereignty-
flexibility that could prove invaluable in responding to nationalist-separatists' demands.
Michael Keating provides an introduction to these terms, establishing that external
sovereignty simply means "that a state has no superior in the international arena," and
that this is "unalienable.,,6 As Keating rightly points out, this definition provides a "huge
and/or international organizations that have standing within.international law (e.g. the UN, the EU, etc.)
4 Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations
(Princeton: Princeton. University Press, 200 I), 77.
5 Ibid, 76.
6 Michael Keating, Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001),12-13.
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incentive" for nationalist-separatists to work toward the goal of statehood.7 He then
discusses internal sovereignty as "unitary internal sovereignty," essentially the privilege
of the state (or the leadership of the state) to maintain full authority over what happens
within its own borders.8
Philpott contributes to the discussion of internal and external dimensions,
cautioning that these "are not distinct types of sovereignty, but complementary, always
coexistent aspects of sovereignty.,,9 This understanding of coexistence seems to reflect
the all-or-nothing attitude toward sovereignty espoused by many nationalist-separatist
movements, making it difficult to imagine a scenario in which the nationalist-separatist
group would be granted one type of sovereignty but not the other. Philpott also points out
that external sovereignty is what is at stake within the realm of international law,
referencing the Charter of the United Nations (UN). 10 The UN Charter, along with
numerous other international legal documents such as the Helsinki Final Act, explicitly
protects the external sovereignty of states. II
Internal and external sovereignty can be further qualified in terms of de facto and
de jure conditions of sovereignty. Although nationalist-separatist movements may have
attained de facto internal sovereignty, a lack of de jure recognition limits them from fully
realizing their potential external sovereignty. 12 As such, despite de facto internal
7 Ibid, 13.
8 Ibid, 14.
9 Daniel Philpott, "Westphalia, Authority, and International Society," Political Studies, XLVII (1999), 570.
10 Ibid, 571.
II See also Chapter I, Article 2, Section 4 of the Charter ofthe United Nations (1945); Chapter I, Article
(a) (especially Clause VI, "Non-intervention in internal affairs") of the Helsinki Final Act (1975).
12 Examples of de facto sovereignty would include Kosovo's autonomous status under the 1974 Yugoslav
Constitution, Northern (Turkish) Cyprus, Taiwan, and others.
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sovereignty, nationalist-separatist movements more often than not persevere in seeking
the legitimacy that de jure sovereignty (both internal and external) affords.
But although international law speaks directly to de jure external sovereignty,
there remains wide berth for subjective interpretation. International legal scholar Gerry
Simpson still regards sovereignty as an "enigma.,,13 He hedges away from a definition of
sovereignty per se and instead chooses to discuss' sovereign equality' as the foundation
upon which international order is based. Sovereign equality, Simpson argues, has two
primary roles: it "parlays into a commitment to a pluralist international legal order (... one
in which state diversity is tolerated)," and "conveys the idea of an egalitarian
international legal order (one in which states are legally equal).,,14
Simpson's interpretation can be applied in at least two different ways. On the one
hand, non-state actors who are pressing for self-determination via statehood--elaiming a
right to their own sovereignty-ean be interpreted as non-state actors who are seeking an
equal relationship among recognized states. On the other hand, should the international
community condone or facilitate a fulfillment of self-determination for nationalist-
separatists within a sovereign entity, they are effectively violating this principle of
sovereign equality.
Hurst Hannum complicates the discussion: "The nature of territorial sovereignty
necessarily implies the fundamental limitation that no state has the right to impose its will
;
on the territory of another, with the exception ofcertain narrow circumstances such as
13 Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 352.
14 Ibid, xii.
10
the protection ofa state's own nationa!s.,,15 Here, we have a clear definition of external
sovereignty (" ...that no state has the right to impose its will on the territory of
another..."), but because of Hannum's qualification, the usefulness of his definition is
somewhat ambiguous-in cases of nationalist secession that feature breakaway regions
based on ethnicity, both the breakaway region and the sovereign state have an interest in
protecting their own nationals.
Mayall defines the sovereign state as a "political unit in which the authorities
have a monopoly oflegal forces.,,16 However, he diverges from Keating, Philpott,
Simpson, and Hannum in that he addresses the modern source of sovereignty, citing a
contemporary shift "from a dynastic to a popular principle oflegitimacy.,,17 This
transition, according to Mayall, is marked by "the people, [who] stopped being subjects
and became sovereign.,,18 Thus, Mayall ties sovereignty to 'the people' rather than
strictly to the state, introducing popular sovereignty as the basis for his "new political
map." 19 This notion of popular sovereignty is tied intrinsically to self-determination.
* * * * *
Clearly, if sovereignty includes unalienable, inviolable, or absolute authority,20
and if states are sovereign, then nationalist-separatist groups have strong incentive to
pursue statehood. This introduces the ongoing debate surrounding self-determination, and
15 Hurst Hannum, Autonomy. Sovereignty, and SelfDetermination: The Accommodation of Conflicting
Rights, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), 19 (emphasis added). ~.
16 James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990),
36.
17 Ibid, 36-37.
18 1bid,41.
19 1bid.
11
a question: at what point, if any, does the right of a pe9ple to seek out their own state in
the name of self-determination trump state sovereignty?
SelfDetermination: Origins and Interpretations
Woodrow Wilson is often credited as the first great champion of self-
determination,21 and his advocacy for the creation of many new nation-states following
the First World War contributed largely to self-determination becoming a principle, and
then a 'right,' rather than simply an abstract construct relegated largely to liberal
theorists, not policymakers. But what, precisely, is self-determination, and from where
and when does it originate? As with sovereignty, the topic is subject to broad
interpretation.
The origins of self-determination can be traced to theories of democracy, as self-
determination appears to be a natural complement to democratic government-a
government that is representative of and accountable to the people should, logically, be
determined by the people as well. Indeed, the democratic theory of self-determination
defines the term as simply "government by consent of the govemed.,,22 Locke alludes to
self-determination in his discussions of political society as he emphasizes that consent is
a necessary virtue of communities and governments?3 He stipulates that every individual
must consent to the creation of a community, but when a community has been formed, it
20 See Philpott, "Westphalia, Authority, and International Security" for a more detailed discussion of
'absolute' and 'non-absolute' versions of sovereignty.
21 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993), 79.
22 Benyamin Neuberger, "National Self-Determination: A Theoretical Discussion," Nationalities Papers,
29:3 (2001),394.
23 John Locke, Second Treatise ofGovernment, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1980 [original
text published in 1690]), 52.
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has the power to act as one body, carried by the "will and determination of the
majority.,,24 Thus, according to Locke's interpretation, self-determination applies to both
the individual and the polity; in that the individual may chose to belong to a community,
and the community may chose its own actions based on the majority will of its
membership.
This grounding in liberal thought influenced both the American and French
Revolutions, as Ronen finds allusions to self-determination in the American Declaration
of Independence. Primary author Thomas Jefferson declared that among "certain
unalienable Rights" there existed "[aright to] Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness,,,25
and this, according to Ronen, can be interpreted as an acknowledgment of the
fundamental aspiration of human beings to control their own lives-that is, to enjoy self-
determination.26 Ronen also suggests that the drive for self-determination that propelled
,'X
the United States of Amerka'-into existence "reemerged in a new geographical and
political setting in the French Revolution.,,27 As such, self-determination has a lengthy
tradition of driving political change, and this tradition has been cited by modern
nationalist-separatists in an attempt to contextualize and legitimize their movements.
Thomas Musgrave offers an understanding of self-determination that draws from
this background, stating that "the concept of self-determination originally developed
throughout Europe and the United States in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries... [it]
24 Ibid.
25 Declaration ofIndependence ofthe United States ofAInerica, as cited in Dov Ronen, The Quest for Self
Determination, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), ix.
26 Ronen, ix.
27 Ibid.
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is understood to occur whenever a people freely determines its own political status.,,28
Thus, for Musgrave, self-determination is not necessarily tied to territory, but rather
relates to the more ambiguous notion of 'political status,' a context that provides more
flexibility the application of self-determination.
Like sovereignty, self-determination can be expressed via external and internal
dimensions.29 External self-determination, as Neuberger suggests, is "the right of every
people to choose sovereignty under which they live" and is categorized by two varieties:
internationally recognized independence for a people, and true independence (as opposed
to limited or quasi-independence) for an already existing state.30 One might argue that
Kosovo's existence as a de facto independent state after 1999's UN Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 places it within the context of both of these guidelines, as
Kosovar Albanians seek to express external self-determination. via the expression of
choice in the sovereign under which they live, and in achieving so-called 'true
independence. '
Neuberger's conceptualization of internal self-determination follows the Lockean
perspective, and Neuberger defines internal self-determination as "the right of every
people to select its own form of government." This is characterized by three varieties:
democracy in a homogeneous state (e.g. what Kosovar-Albanians presently aspire to
achieve); autonomy or federalism for a distinct people within a democratic state (e.g.
what Belgrade offered Kosoyo during the 2006-07 status talks),'or autonomy/federalism
(
28 Thomas Musgrave, Self-Determination and National Minorities (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1997),2.
29 For a more detailed discussion of internal and external self-determination, see also Chapter 6 of David
Raic, Statehood and the Law ofSelf-Determination (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002).
30 Neuberger, 392.
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for a distinct group within a non-democratic system (e.g. Kosovo' s status under the 1974
Yugoslav constitutional revision).31 However, a right to select one's own government is
does not necessarily imply that one has a right to select their own state.
Additionally, Neuberger asserts that each of these varieties of political self-
determination is discrete from what he terms "cultural self-determination," the "right to
teach and study in one's own language, to develop and autonomous culture and to resist
assimilation by a dominant power.,,32 This tie to culture forms theliasis upon which most
individual-level applications of self-determination take place, in that they apply to the
individual's rights within a sovereign state.33 It is important to note that these types of
cultural recognition and protection do not guarantee any right to self-determination that
would impinge on the overarching state's right to preserve its own external sovereignty.
Moving beyond theoretical discourse, con~ider self-determination's relationship
with international law. Although self-determination has been the subject of theoretical
debate since at least the Enlightenment period, self-determination as a legal principle,
right, or entitlement has only existed in any significant capacity since 1917.34
Malanczuk adapts Akehurst's basic designation, establishing self-determination as
"the right of a people living in a territory to determine the political and legal status of that
territory-for example, by setting up a state of their own or choosing to become part of
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid, 393.
33 An example of these types of applications would include protections granted to indigenous populations.
These populations are permitted self-expression and occasionally some degree of self-governance or
autonomy (e.g. Native Americans in the United States, Aborigines in Australia, etc.)
34 "Clause 4: Likewise, in accordance with the declaration of statesmen of the Quadruple Alliance, the
protection of the rights of minorities constitutes an essential component part of the constitutional rights of
peoples to self-determination. The Allied Governments also grant validity to this principle everywhere,
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another state.,,35 That is to say, for Malanczuk, self-determination is tied intrinsically to
statehood (and thus, territory, if statehood is predicated on territory). International law
has mixed responses to this interpretation, as the coupling of self-determination and
territorial claims has proven fraught with contention.36
Given the aforementioned perspectives, it is evident that this notion of 'self-
determinatio~,' although long-standing, remains ill-defined. Competing perspectives
apply the principle to the individual, to a collective body of individuals, or both, and
competing perspectives place varying limitations to self-determination-does it apply to
actors under a larger sovereign, or does self-determination sometimes trump the
(
sovereign? This lack of a clear definition of the principle is one reason why it has been so
difficult to apply it consistently among cases.
Since 1917, self-determination's interpretations and applications have expanded
and contracted within the international system, leaving uncertain how the international
community should respond to nationalist-separatist groups' demands for self-
determination. These expansions and contractions have resulted in the classification of
self-determination usually as a principle, sometimes as a right, and most recently as an
entitlement.
in so far as it is practically realizable." (Source: Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference, 28 December 1917, as
cited in Moynihan, 78 [emphasis added]).
35 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law (New York: Routledge, 1997),
326.
36 Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to include a thorough discussion of the principle of
self-determination's connection to territorial claims. For additional information on this topic, see also Lea
Brilmayer, "Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation," Yale Journal of International
Law, Vol. 16, No. 177 (1991); also, Allen Buchanan, "Toward a Theory of Secession," Ethics, Vol. 101,
No.2 (January 1991), and Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to
Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder: Westview,Press, 1991).
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SelfDetermination: Principle, Right, Entitlement
Self-determination's natural connection to democracy facilitated the first major
worldwide wave of self-determination movements connected to a quest for statehood.
The conclusion of the First World War ushered in the demise of Europe's continental
empires, and the collapse of both the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires led to the
formation of numerous smaller states whose primary qualification for statehood was their
national (that is, ethnic) composition. Because "[s]tates were presumed to be legitimate
when they were democratically constituted,,,37 adopting or implementing democracy in
these nascent states became de rigueur. By delineating the boundaries of these states
along ethnic or national lines and by actively promoting democratization within them, the
peacemakers at Versailles effectively institutionalized a claim to self-determination on
the basis of ethnicity or nationality. This dismantlement and reconstruction of the
international system serves as the foundation upon which most modem self-determination
movements draw their justification.
With the conclusion of the Second World War and the creation of the UN, the
international system underwent yet another revision. Although the arrangement of
dynastic empires was by then archaic, most of the great powers still maintained colonial
empires, and the vast majority of these were in Africa and Asia. As such, the next major
chapter in the evolution of self-determination takes place during the era of
decolonization. By the 1950s, democratization efforts had taken a temporary second stage
37 Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the
Twentieth Centwy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 87.
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to decolonization movements, and self-determination made its complicated entrance into
the international legal realm.
The UN Charter opens with a reference to the "self-determination of peoples,"
stipulating that one of the fundamental purposes of the organization is to "respect.. .the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples ... ,,38 As a curiosity, it is
perhaps worth noting that the Charter mentions self-determination prior to any
mentioning of sovereignty or territorial integrity, although it does not explicitly guarantee
a right to self-determination-rather, it merely acknowledges the existence and validity
of the principle. Self-determination as a right was confirmed in 1960 with UN Security
Council Resolution 1514, which stated that "all peoples have an inalienable right to
complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty, and the integrity of their national
territory," and declared "all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social,
and cultural development.,,39 By 1966, after the height of the African and Asian
decolonization movements had passed, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (lCCPR) and its signatories confirmed this right.4o
Almost immediately after a right to self-determination had been established,
questions of the application of this right began to press international law, and in 1970 the
UN addressed these concerns with the Declaration on Friendly Relations. This document
affirmed UNSCR-1514 and the ICCPR's definition of the right, and also establishe~ that
38 Charter o/the United Nations, Chapter I, Article I. Section 2.
39 UN Security Council Resolution 1514, "Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial
countries and peoples" (1960), Preamble and Operative Clause 2.
40 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 1966, ratified 1976), Part I, Article I,
Section 1: "All peoples have the right to self-determination."
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"[e]very State has the duty to promote...realization of the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples.,,41 But not only were UN member states now obligated to
promote the realization of self-determination, self-determination was now tied directly to
a right to a state: "The establishment ofa sovereign and independent State, the free
association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other
political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right
of self-determination by that people.,,42 Here, self-determination has made a clear
transition from earlier documents' references to nebulously-construed l;conomic and
cultural rights to UN-legitimated claims to territory.
It would appear that the General Assembly realized the potentially problematic
impact of the Declaration, and so it offered this caveat just prior to a section addressing
sovereign equality:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to
race, creed, or color.
Every State shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial or total disruption of
the national unity and territorial integrity of any other State or country.43
Although the Declaration on Friendly Relations is still somewhat ambiguous in setting
out the conditions under which a people would be justified in its pursuit of self-
4\ UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), "Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations," (1970).
'42 Ibid (emphasis added).
43 Ibid.
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determination,44 it is clear in its insistence that states should not interfere with other
states' territorial integrity. Furthermore, it establishes a clear connection between self-
determination and statehood (or at the very least, territory). On this, Emerson writes:
As colonialism is held to be incompatible with the Charter [of the UN], so is any
attempt to appeal to self-determination in such fashion as to disrupt "the national
unity a~d territorial integrity" of a country which is achieving or has already
achieved independence. Laid out in these terms, self-determination safeguards the
maintenance and advancement of the state-nations as they have been delimited by
the colonial powers but denies the right to existence ofnations within, or cutting
across, the states which have been so formed. 45
Emerson's evaluation of decolonization's effect on self-determination suggests
that the principle ought to be understood as a right only in colonial cases, and only as a
,
one-time offer-self-determination was to be the principle underlying former colonies'
rights to independent statehood, but beyond this, its applications were sharply limited.
The decolonization movements spanning the 1950s and 60s marked the single
. most dramatic increase in UN member states, matched only by the period immediately
following the fall of the Soviet Union.46 This period also marked the largest role ever
before played by an international organization (the UN) in the creation of those states. As
a result, the international system was simultaneously more interconnected and more
ethnically, nationally, and territorially factionalized than ever before.47 The popular
sentiments that instigated the period of decolonization left European state boundaries
44 For example, how does one determine whether a state truly is "conducting itself in compliance with the
principle of equal rights?" Who determines that a government is an authentic representation of the "whole
people?" The Friendly Relations Declaration's most impactful statement is fraught with ambiguities.
45 Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization, (Cambridge: Harvard
University Centre for International Affairs, 1964),29-30 (emphasis added).
46 In 1955, the UN was comprised of 76 member states; by 1960, membership had increased by 23 states
for a total of 99 member states. By contrast, between 1990 and 1993, UN membership grew from 159 to
184, an increase of 25 states (Source: "Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945-present," available at:
http://www.un.orglmembers/growth.shtml).
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largely unaffected, partially due to the fact that Europe was still bound by the bipolar
hegemony arrangement of the Cold War-that is to say, the gravity of the United States'
influence over Western Europe and the Soviet Union's influence over Central and
Eastern Europe preserved the European status quo. By contrast, the end of the Cold War
and the fall of the Soviet Union ushered in renewed calls for self-determination and a
subsequent round of state-creation reminiscent of the World War I Paris Peace
Conference. This progressed relatively smoothly in Central Europe as Germany reunited
and Czechoslovakia divided. The situation in the Balkans, however, was not so simple.
By this time, the conflict among principles of self-determination had emerged,
and competing viewpoints proposed differing applications. Those who subscribed to the
Wilsonian school of thought found that self-determination was largely a positive
development within the context of international relations-finally, the long-oppressed
'people' would have their chance to be heard. This approach seemed to hold in the early
period of decolonization, but as self-determination entered the mainstream, the need for
prudence in its application became increasingly evident.
Self-Determination and the Dissolution ofYugoslavia
On 25 June 1991, Slovenia was the first of the six Yugoslav republics to declare
. its independence. Despite vocal opposition from the Serb-dominated Yugoslav
Parliament, military conflict over Slovenia was kept at a relative minimum. In parallel
with the Slovenian declaration, Croatia also declared indepenQence from Yugoslavia, and
the result was a bitterly fought war tpat did not end until the signing of the Dayton Peace
47 This is one consequence of the dissolution of empires, be they colonial, imperial, or otherwise.
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Agreement in 1995. Amidst international uncertainty, recognition of these declarations of
independence compounded the situation. Members of the international community may
have been lulled into a false sense of security given the comparative ease with which
Slovenia seceded; however, recognition of an independent Republic of Croatia
exacerbated the conflict and fostered its spread throughout the region-Gary Dempsey
contends that this acknowledgement of Slovenian and Croatian rights to self-
determination was "premature" and "paved the way for the disintegration of Yugoslavia
and the resulting Bosnia tragedy," led by Germany.48 Dempsey infers that "Germany
thought it was helping matters by involving the international community in the Balkan
dispute, expecting that that would stem the tide ofwar.,,49
Furthermore, the largest problem with recognizing Slovenia, Croatia, and later
Bosnia was that the Western states were not actually recognizing the newfound
independence of the Yugoslav republics (whose boundaries had already been mapped and
whose populations were ethnically mixed)-they were effectively recognizing the
essential commandeering of these republics by their respective dominant ethnic groups.
This illustrates the problems that arise when it is unclear precisely which 'people' is
entitled to self-determination, at the probable expense of other peoples.
The international community's recognition of Croatian independence lent
credence to Croatian nationalist-separatists who were perpetrating the break from
Yugoslavia. Additionally, Western support for Croatia added fuel to Serbian leader
Slobodan MiloseviC's fire and swelled support for Milosevic and his nationalist platform.
48 Gary Dempsey, "Kosovo Crossfire," Mediterranean Quarterly (Summer 1998), I07. Germany was (now
somewhat notoriously) the first to recognize Slovenian and Croatian independence on 15 January 1992.
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The lesson to be learned from these events suggests that international interference in self-
determination movements may actually promote conflict, particularly vis-a-vis those
movements for whom independent statehood is a goal. At the very least, the Slovenian
and Croatian cases illustrate a need for temperance in the application of self-
determination.
Self-Determination: Praises and Criticisms
The break-up of Yugoslavia and the wars that it generated in the 1990s inspired a
great many opinions cautioning against poorly thought out guarantees for a right to self-
determination. This more recent discussion coupled with earlier arguments for and
against the concept highlights some of the most pressing quandaries associated with self-
determination.
Advocates of claims to self-determination argue that self-determination promotes
democracy and fosters greater protection of human rights. Philpott goes so far as to assert
that "[s]elf-determination is inextricable from democracy; our ideals commit us to it."sO
Based on this premise, Philpott argues that "any group of individuals within a defined
territory which desires to govern itself more independently enjoys aprimafacie right to
self-determination."sl This statement is problematic in that it introduces the possibility of
fairly sweeping applications, in that not only does Philpott refer to self-determination as a
"right," but he also says that it can be applied to "any group of individuals within a
defined territory)' It is important to note, however, that Philpott does not argue that self-
49 Dempsey, 107.
50 Daniel Philpott, "In Defense of Self-Determination," Ethics, 105 (January 1995), 353.
5\ Ibid.
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determination should necessarily be granted in the form secession or statehood-he refers
only to a desire to "govern itself more independently." Rather, 'moral autonomy' appears
to be the intended outcome for Philpott-"the sort that Immanuel Kant had in mind when
he argued that a moral individual is a free individual, one who acts not upon his
unreflective desires or base inclinations, or under the force or persuasion, psychical or
physical, or another, but according to his own free will, pursuing ends that he has set for
himself.,,52
Arguments cautioning against the promiscuous application of self-determination
are much more widely available. While he was serving in the administration of President
Wilson, former U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing famously remarked that self-
determination "is simply loaded with dynamite," cautioning that the concept "will raise
hopes which can never be realized.,,53 Moynihan echoes Lansing's sentiments,
complaining that vague references to self-determination are far too broadly applicable;
that they are often misapplied, and that self-determination as a general construct cannot
neatly be contained. He goes so far as to suggest that upon the inception of the UN, "the
Westphalian state system was finished;" criticizing the UN Charter because it provides
"no satisfactory answer to the question as to what self-determination... actually means.,,54
Returning to the relationship between self-determination and statehood, Etzioni
issues a stinging rebuke to supporters of what he calls "toy" states as he questions,
"[W]hat meaning does self-determination have when minuscule countries are at the
economic and military mercy, even whim, of larger states-states in whose government
52 Ibid, 356.
53 Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1921),97.
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they have no representation at all?,,55 This touches on one of the most recurrent criticisms
offered by opponents of Kosovo' s independence--even upon independence, will Kosovo
be sustainable, or even viable? If the reason of the state is the state, it follows that its
viability should be achieved prior to any expression of self-determination in the form of
breakaway statehood.
Etzioni also asserts that self-determination through secession, contrary to its
purported intentions to represent the will of the people, is actually a detriment to
democracy: "Excessive self-determination works against democratization and threatens
democracy in countries that have already attained it. Self-determination movements
~
challenge democracy by chipping away at its structural and socio-psychological
foundations.,,56 Indeed, if one of democracy's greatest attributes is that it grants an equal
voice to all members within heterogeneous societies, it would appear that by granting a
homogenous group the privilege of simply'opting out' of a society or state in favor of
expressing their right to self-determination (through the creation of their own separate
society or state), this key selling point of democracy is lost. Why cooperate within the
system, when one need only call upon a right to self-determination to exit the system?
In light of these competing perspectives, Jan Klabbers draws the conclusion that
self-determination, whatever its positive and negative attributes may be, is not a right but
rather a procedural norm; a reasonable expectation but by no means a guarantee.57 This
procedural norm has been established through the findings of cases brought before the
54 Moynihan, 97 (emphasis original).
55 Amitai Etzioni, "The Evils of Self-Determination," Foreign Policy, 89 (Winter 1992-1993),28.
56 Ibid, 3 I.
57 Jan Klabbers, "The Right to be Taken Seriously: Self-Determination in International Law," Human
Rights Quarterly, 28 (2006), 186.
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International Court of Justice (lCJ), most pertaining to African decolonization. In
particular, although the 1975 Western Sahara case did not find a right to self-
determination, it did confirm that there was a principle of self-determination ("a principle
of the right to self-determination"), and that this principle could be interpreted as an
entitlement contingent upon circumstances. Klabbers illustrates with a metaphor: "... one
may be entitled to have loving parents, but surely one has no (legal) right to loving
parents.,,58
Klabbers finds that ultimately, human rights issues are at the crux of self-
determination discourse. Along this vein, he argues that calls for self-determination are
essentially calls for "the right to be taken seriously,,,59 no matter the minority or majority
status of the people. This returns to Philpott's connection between self-determination and
democracy, as Klabbers points out that "even democracy, however valuable, can lapse
into the tyranny of the majority.,,60
SelfIJetermination vs. Sovereignty
Now that we have developed some understanding of the definitional, theoretical,
and historical dimensions of sovereignty and self-determination, we must next consider
the practical elements of their relationship with each other. Self-determination as it is
sought within the Kosovo case i.s a problem for Serbian sovereignty, and the fulfillment
of any 'right' to self-determination via secession presents an inherent conflict. If
members of the international community support Kosovo's declaration of independence
58 Ibid, 195.
59 Ibid, I89.
60 Ibid, 205.
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and foster its separation from Serbia, these members will be in violation of a variety of
charters, resolutions, and treaties. Furthermore, take precedent-if outside states are
permitted to initiate, instigate, or otherwise facilitate this violation of territorial integrity,
who aside from the modem 'great powers' is not vulnerable? Consider these questions
especially in light of the means by which Kosovar Albanians began their recent quest for
independence with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a guerilla military organization
that has been listed on the U.S. State Department's list of terrorist groups.
This is the dark side to self-determination. It follows that if self-determination is
espoused as a fundamental right of the people, then organizations such as the KLA are
legitimated, justified, and perhaps 'even vindicated. This consequence is not limited to
Kosovo-eonsider nationalist-separatist organizations such as the Provisional Irish
Republican Army (PIRA) or the Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), both either
previously or currently classified as terrorist organizations. If the international
community extends a lukewarm, permissive response to nationalist-separatist movements
that resort to violent tactics to get their point across, then they will be allowing separatist
objectives to supersede the doctrine of territorial sovereignty-but more significantly,
this type of response will legitimize the morally questionable acts of violence that
accompany the most bitter struggles for self-determination. On this, Dov Ronen cautions,
"The nobility of the idea does not guarantee nobility of action.,,61
* * * * *
The tensions between self-determination and sovereignty have reached a
flashpoint in Kosovo, as a two-year long process of internationally-mediated negotiations
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ended in stalemate in December 2007. The province recently issued a unilateral
declaration of independence from Serbia on 17 February 2008, and the new Republic of
Kosovo awaits the world's formal recognition. 62 This has resulted in a series of
diplomatic clashes between supporting and opposing states, most notably between the
United States and Russia. Kosovo's declaration of independence threatens to destabilize
the former Yugoslav region, in addition to setting a dangerous precedent for other
nationalist-secessionist conflicts throughout the world. Furthermore, the international
community at large has offered mixed responses to an independent Kosovo, ranging from
the enthusiastic supportof the United States and much of Western Europe to staunch
refusals of recognition from Russia, China, Spain, and others, as well as the risk of
-......-"
violent conflict. Recognition of nationalist-separatist self-determination movements has
led to grave consequences in the Balkans, and these should not be left to fade from recent
memory. Thus, the question of Kosovo is worth exploring-what happened to 'lessons
learned?' Were there any lessons to be learned from the Balkan wars of the 1990s, and if
so, have they been forgotten, or do they simply not apply to the Kosovo case?
In light of the difficulties faced throughout the attempt to broker a mutually-
agreeable settlement to the Kosovo-Serbia conflict, one must wonder why finding a
resolution to this conflict has proven so challenging, and beyond this, what are some of
the aggravating elements inherent to nationally- or ethnically-driven territorial disputes.
As such, it is essential to develop an understanding of the roots of the conflict-why is
Kosovo held so dear by both the Serbs and the Albanians? What is the history of the
.6\ Ronen.
62 As of24 April 2008, 39 countries have formally recognized Kosovo. See Appendix A for a complete list.
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conflict, and what are its critical elements? Why can no compromise be reached? An
attempt to shed some light upon these questions follows in Chapter 2.
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CHAPTER 2- HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND JUSTIFICATION
The roots of the Kosovo conflict draw deeply from disputed histories-both
Serbs63 and Albanians64 argue for historical ownership of the territory, and each party
lays their claim to Kosovo based on the understanding that 'they were there first,' and
that they have suffered some egregious historical violation at the hands of the other that
led to their initial displacement from the territory (and thus, a loss of control over the
territory). Philpott summarizes how historical grievances are integrated into nationalist
ideology: "A group that was once invaded, annexed, or robbed of its land through
diplomatic subterfuge and continues, through literature, stories handed down, and the
brave acts of dissidents, to tend the memory of its glorious, innocent, free, untrammeled
past, staving off the homogenizing intentions of its oppressors, has suffered a historical
grievance.,,65
Lea Brilmayer and Allen Buchanan both address the issue of historical grievances
within nationalist-separatist self-determination movements who seek to achieve territorial
sovereignty through secession. Brilmayer describes the "typical secessionist claim" as
"[coupling] an argument about ethnic distinctiveness with an historical claim to a
63 The designation 'Serbs' includes Serbs from Serbia proper as well as Kosovar Serbs.
64 The designation 'Albanians' refers to all Albanians, regardless of whether they live in Albania proper,
Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, or elsewhere. The designation 'Kosovar Albanians' is used to specifically
address Albanians living in Kosovo.
65 Philpott, "In Defense of Self-Determination," 376. As evidenced by his somewhat hyperbolic description
of historical grievances, Philpott does not support these as justification for self-determination, via
secession-" ... this is the wrong kind of claim to require: land is only r~levant to the extent that a people
under a common government live on it; and self-government, not a legal argument about the history of
one's land, is the central issue."
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particular piece of land.,,66 This is an accurate description of the Kosovo conflict;
however, the challenge lies in that both the Serbs and the Kosovar Albanians make this
claim. Brilmayer and Buchanan find that historical grievances are a compelling cause for
self-determination movements to pursue secession, and Brilmayer views this as
"right[ing] historical wrongs,,,67 establishing what she believes are "the most intuitively
appealing and direct territorial claims.,,68 Buchanan refers to historical grievances as
"obvious" and "simple" justification for secession, stating that "secession is merely the
reappropriation of territory wrongfully taken.,,69 However, Brilmayer issues a caveat:
"Unjust historical occurrences do not automatically give rise to contemporary movements
to right past wrongs.,,70 Thus, although unjust historical occurrences in a people's
collective memory may provide the fuel needed to sustain a separatist movement, there
must be some catalyst to ignite the fire beneath the movement.
But what if the historical background in which a territorial conflict is enshrouded
is unclear or uncertain? What if the violators and the violated are not so easily
identifiable-how does one know who are the aggrieved? The 'ambiguity of victimhood is
the severest challenge of the Kosovo case, as well as the cases that stand extract some
precedent for their own movements from the Kosovo case.
* * * * *
Although historical rights do not automatically legitimate one group's claim to
disputed territory, contested histories do playa vital role in fanning the flames of current
66 Lea Brilmayer, "Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation," Yale Journal of
International Law, Vol. 16, No. 177 (1991),189.
67 Ibid, 19 I.
68 Ibid, 189.
69 Allen Buchanan, "Toward a Theory of Secession," Ethics, Vol. 101, No.2 (January 1991),342,
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nationalist-secessionist conflicts, which can in turn produce Brilmayer's "contemporary
movements to right past wrongs." Kosovo, the epicenter of what is perhaps Europe's
most ardent nationalist conflict, exemplifies how nationalist myths entrenched in murky
history can affect current policy debates.
Despite its overwhelming Albanian majority, KOSOV071_Kosovo and Metohija,n
or Kosmet73-is revered by Serbs as the heart of the medieval Serbian empire and the
place at which the Serbian national identity was forged. Serbs argue that Kosovo is
intrinsically Serbian, and that it was not until the Ottoman Turks invaded in 1389 that
Albanians began to settle in the region, repopulating Kosovo and displacing Serbs.
Contrary to this account, Albanians make the same basic contention-that Kosova74 is
inherently Albanian, and that their homeland was invaded by Slavic barbarians as
recently as the i h century A.D.
The remainder of this chapter will focus on establishing the historical contexts
within which the Serbs and the K6sovar Albanians base their claims to Kosovo, tracing
both groups' roots to their most commonly accepted origins and progressing through the
Ottoman era, the World Wars and Tito's rule, and in particular the Milosevi6 period to
the present. It will then attempt to illustrate how this historical background shapes the
justifications of nationalist-separatists' claims to self-determination via territorial
70 Brilmayer, 191.
7\ A disclaimer on spelling-'Kosovo' is the most commonly accepted international spelling, as well as the
Serbian-language spelling of the territory. In no way is the use of this spelling intended to convey a
preference for the Serbian over the Albanian-language spel1ing.
72 'Metohija' ('church lands') refers specifically to western and southern Kosovo, and is where most of the
Serbian Orthodox Church's most meaningful religious sites are located.
73 For a brief period during the mid-20th century, 'Kosmet' was the preferred designation of for the territory
on most maps.
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sovereignty, illustrating how both the Serbian and Kosovar Albanian claims can be
upheld under current internationallaw/norms. Finally, this chapter will discuss whether it
is possible that one group's call for self-determination can be somehow 'more legitimate'
than the other's, and will address the broader debate over whether or not historical
grievances should be permitted to underscore international law and norms, thereby
playing a pivotal and perhaps inescapable role in the resolution or continuation of
nationalist-separatist conflicts.
Kosovo IS SERBIA
"Jerusalem and the Alamo Rolled into One"
Kosovo is not prized by the Serbs for the bountiful economic benefits that it has
to offer; it is not contested for its abundant natural resources or for its geostrategic
location (Kosovo is, in fact, landlocked and surrounded by mountains). The Serbs hold
Kosovo dear because Kosovo is where the Serbian Orthodox national and spiritual
identity met and was defeated by its Other-Muslim Turkish imperialists who would rule
oppressively for more than four centuries. For the Serbs, Kosovo is "their Jerusalem and
Alamo rolled into one.,,75
The story of the Serbian nation begins with medieval Serbia, and medieval Serbia
traces the origins of its regional dominance to the 12th century, under the dynasty founded
by Stefan Nemanja. 76 Nemanja led the expansionist Serbs in territorial conquest
throughout the region, and Serbia emerged as a significant power within the Balkans
74 'Kosova' is the Albanian-language spelling of Kosovo, and is often used to convey a distinct political
position on the territory.
75 Serbian Ministry for Kosovo and Metohija, "Kosovo: The Crown of Serbian History" (2006).
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during the 13th century under the rule of King Stefan Uros II Milutin. As the Serbs
established their medieval empire, the Byzantine Empire was steadily crumbling, and this
in part contributed to the success of the Serbs in consolidating their power within the
region. By the 14th century, the Serbian Empire stretched from the Drina River in the
west to the Danube in the north, spanning as far eastward as most of the modem-day
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and including much oftoday's
Greece stopping just short of Athens.77 This was the empire of King Stefan Uros IV
Dusan, grandson of King Milutin, and it marks the apex of the Serbian Empire. Dusan's
rule lasted only from 1331 until his death in 1355, but because Dusan ruled the empire at
the height of its glory, cultural anthropologist Branimir Anzulovic believes that, "the
Turkish conquest [at Kosovo] was made more traumatic for the Serbs by the fact that it
began only sixteen years after the death of Emperor Dusan the Mighty.,,78
Under the emperors of the Nemanjic dynasty, the Serbian Orthodox Church
established itself as a discrete unit away from the Greek Orthodox Church. During this
process of differen!iation, numerous monasteries and churches were built, most of them
in Kosovo. These monasteries and churches are now considered the oldest and holiest
sites of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and are one of the bitterest points of contention
within the Kosovo conflict today. Of these, Pecka Patriarsija, located just outside the city
ofPec (Albanian: Peja) stands as the most significant, as it has been the site of the
Patriarchy of the Serbian Orthodox Church since 1346. Other major religious sites
76 Iva Sanae, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origin, History, Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1984);37.
77 See Appendix B, Map 1.
78 Branimir Anzulovic, Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide, (New York: New York University Press,
1999),36.
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emerging from this period include the Gracanica monastery,79 five kilometers outside of
Kosovo's capital city Pristina (Albanian: Prishtina); the Visoki Decani monastery in
western Kosovo, and the monastery of the Holy Archangels in Prizren.
28 June 1389 remains the single most significant date in Serbian history, for it
was on this date that the invading Ottoman Turks would effectively crush the Serbian
empire at the Battle of Kosovo Polje (literally, "Field of Blackbirds.,,)8o Moreover, this
date marks the beginning of the collective psychology of victimization that pervades the
Serbian national identity to this day.
Although there is historical consensus that the Serbs, led by Tsar Lazar
Hrebeljanovi6, 8\ were defeated at the Battle ofKosovo, Anzulovic argues that the Turks
were not victorious. He points out that the Ottoman leader Sultan Murat (Murad) I was
also killed; that Turkish forces "suffered losses so heavy that [they] could not continue
the campaign and had to return home," and that "[a]mong the preserved sources from
1389, not a single one speaks of a Turkish success, and the majority testify to a Turkish
defeat.,,82 Nevertheless, at the Battle of Kosovo, Tsar Lazar was killed and the Serbs were
defeated, thereby gaining a martyr but losing their empire. Contemporary references to
the martyrdom of Tsar Lazar are shown through groups such as the Guard of Tsar Lazar,
a Serbian nationalist group that commemorates Lazar by marching from Belgrade to
79 Gracanica is particularly significant because of its distinction of having a printing press and library on the
premises since 1539, one of very few in the region at the time. Commissioned by Serbian Bishop Nikanor,
the printing press at Gracanica is often cited as evidence of high rates of literacy among Serbs, even dating
back to the 16th century, and is sometimes used to qualify claims that the Serbs were the most 'civilized'
among Balkan peoples.
80 Rebecca West, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon (New York: The Viking Press, 1943),835.
81 Actually a Serbian Prince ('Knez'), Lazar is traditionally accorded the title 'Tsar' due to his role in the
Battle of Kosovo and subsequent place in history.
82 Anzulovic, 39.
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Kosovo Polje annually, arriving at the site of the 1389 battle on its 28 June anniversary.
More dramatically, the body of Lazar has been preserved since the Battle of Kosovo, and
in 1989 the defeated Serb's remains were paraded throughout Serbia and Kosovo in
commemoration of the 600th anniversary of the event.
By 1459, the Ottoman Turks had pressed forward to Belgrade and had completely
incorporated Serbia into the Ottoman Empire, a status quo that would remain in place for
419 years.
ANCIENT ILLYRIA, ROMAN DARDANIA, AND SLAVIC INVASIONS
At this point, it is worth mentioning that Albanians are not Slavs-they are a
unique and separate branch of Indo-European ethnic groups, whose language, although
Indo-European, is not related to any other modem language. And even though it is clear
that Albanians are not Slavs, it is not entirely clear from which ethnic group present-day
Albanians have descended, or in what century Albanians arrived in the Balkans. This
uncertainty has left Albanian ancestry open to interpretation, but a substantial (though not
wholly substantiated) body of evidence leads most Albanians to claim that they are the
direct descendents of the ancient Illyrians. If modem Albanians are the descendents of the
Illyrians, the argument goes, then it is the Albanians who have the rightful claim to
Kosovo based on historical grievances suffered at the hands of not one but two pivotal
invasions-the Slavs, and then later the Ottomans.
The Illyrians inhabited the western part of the Balkan Peninsula from roughly
2000 B.C., and were defeated by the Romans in 165 B.C.83 This part of the Roman
83 Dempsey, 95.
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Empire-Illyricum and Thrace (now part of present-day FYR Macedonia)--eventually
became known as Dardania. Under Dardania, major Kosovar cities including Pristina
(then Ulpiana) and Prizren (then Therranda) were founded. As elsewhere in the Roman
Empire, the Romans promoted the adoption of Christianity amongst the Illyrians and
Thracians, and Kosovar Albanians to this day will remind those who ask about their
history that they were once Christians (Roman Catholic and, later, Byzantine/Greek
Orthodox) before the Ottoman conversions to Islam.84 Dardania stood for several hundred
years until the Slavic invasions of the late 4th century A.D. Slavs (predominantly
including early Bulgars, Croats, and Serbs) continued their raids on the Roman outposts,
establishing dominance in the region by the late ihor 8th century. In stark contrast to this
account, the Serbian Ministry for Kosovo and Metohija holds that the area was "largely
deserted" at the time the Serbs populated KoSOVO. 85
Some historians point out that the Serbian consolidation of power did not begin in
Kosovo, but rather in Raska, located in present-day Serbia along the western border with
Bosnia-Herzegovina. On this, Noel Malcolm writes:
... the cradle of Serbian monasticism in the first two or three generations of
Nemanjid rule was located where the cradle of the Serbian state had been [at
Raska]: not inside Kosovo, but further to the north and west. It was only later,
with the development of the Patriarchate buildings at Pee, and the fourteenth-
century foundations of Gracanica, Decani, and the monastery of the Holy
Archangels in Prizren, that Kosovo gained any real importance for the Nemanjid
church-building programme.,,86
84 In a conversation that took place on 15 July 2007, one Kosovar Albanian man from a village near Prizren
explained to me that because Albanians were the descendents of the Illyrians, and because the Il1yrians
were Christians, all of the oldest churches in Kosovo were actually not originally Serbian religious sites but
rather Albanian.
85 Serbian Ministry for Kosovo and Metohija, "Kosovo: The Crown of Serbian History" (2006).
86 Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short Histmy (New York: New York University Press, 1998),46.
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Thus, Malcolm's argument follows, Kosovo was not inherently central to the
development of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Rather, it was later incorporation to the
development of the medieval Serbian national and spiritual identity. If this is the case,
then the Albanians' claim to Kosovo is more credible.
For further examples of inconsistencies in history, an examination of Serbian and
Kosovar Albanian primary and secondary school curricula is revealing. In a comparison
between the two education systems, Kosovar Albanian political analyst Nexhmedin
Spahiu describes how Kosovar Albanians are taught their ancestry:
At the age of 11, young Kosovars learn that:
They are the descendents of the famous Illyrians who once inhabited the
whole Balkans;
Alexander the Great by mother was Illyrian too [sic];
In [the] i h century the fatal misfortune happened: the wild primitive Slav[ic]
tribes from behind the Carpathians arrived in the Balkans and destroyed
everything civilized and progressive, and, in addition, the Illyrians as a
peaceful people left the cities and started mountain life. 87
However, Spahiu also highlights what Kosovar Albanians do not learn:
Generally, it is too difficult to prove which present-day peoples are the
descendents of certain ancient peoples, including here the case of Albanians
and Illyrians;
The medieval and ancient ancestry is too distant to pretend superiority or
primacy--even if it is true that the Slavs arrived in the Balkans as wild tribes
and destroyed Illyrian civilization, nobody can prove that Illyrians had not
come from somewhere some centuries or millennia before, probably more
wild [sic].88
The disparities between both groups' educational background serve to perpetuate
both the Serbs' and the Kosovar Albanians' beliefs that they are the true original
occupants ofKosovo, and are thus its rightful occupants. Kosovar Albanians are taught
87 Nexhmedin Spahiu, Serbian Tendencies for Partitioning of Kosova (Budapest: Central European
University, 1999),25. For a wealth of additional examples, see Spahiu, 15-37.
88 Ibid.
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that Serbia's claim to the territory has effectively been stolen away from the Albanians;
that Serbia's period of regional hegemony was too brief to really 'count', and that
Kosovo is therefore intrinsically Albanian land. Meanwhile, Serbs are taught that their
ancestors are responsible for civilizing the region, for introducing the printing press and
building glorious churches and monasteries with frescoes that could rival the Italians' ,
and that all of this was effectively usurped from them by the insidious Albanians who
were enabled to permeate and repopulate Kosovo in the aftermath of the defeat at Kosovo
Polje. These competing historical interpretations served as the backdrop to Serb-Albanian
relations during the centuries of Ottoman occupation, and they continue to influence both
groups' positions on the issue of to which group Kosovo should belong based on
historical rights of ownership.
There are also points to which neither the Serbs nor the Albanians will readily
concede. For example, there is wide agreement amongst historians that Serbs and
Albanians, along with Bulgarians, Montenegrins, and others fought alongside one another
against the Ottoman army at the Battle of Kosovo, yet Serbs and Albanians will only
begrudgingly admit that they once faced a common enemy together.
Finally, with regard to disagreement upon 'who was there first,' Spahiu points out
that "mass migrations at that time were a normal phenomenon, for many reasons
including not only wars, but also diseases and economic reasons toO.,,89 This gives rise to
several plausible scenarios: the first, that even if modem Albanians are the direct
descendants of the ancient Illyrians, they may have migrated westward prior to the Slavic
invasions-this would make the Serbs correct in their assessment that the territory was
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"largely deserted" upon their arrival in the region. A second potential scenario is that
modem Albanians may not be the direct descendents of the Illyrians, but may have
existed separately in the mountains of modem Albania proper and were compelled to
migrate eastward to Kosovo at some point either during the Serbs' rule or after the
Ottoman defeat.
* * * * *
Although the medieval period of Balkan history is critical to understanding the
underlying elements of the Kosovo conflict, a brief overview of events beginning with
Serbian independence in 1878 and progressing through the major events of the 20th
century is essential to grasping the complexities of the conflict between self-
determination and sovereignty that continues to date.
THE COLLAPSE OF THE OTTOMANS
Under the Ottomans, Kosovo existed as a vilayet, or province, within the empire.
Many Albanians converted to Islam while living under Turkish rule, and those who
converted enjoyed a privileged position relative to those who refused to abandon
Christianity. Because most Serbs staunchly retained their Orthodox religious affiliation,
this meant that in Kosovo, Serbs were subordinate to converted Albanians who
eventually became "central to the Ottoman administration of Kosovo,,90-thus giving the
defeated Serbs even more reason for resentment. To date, most Albanians are very
89 Ibid, 18.
90 Dempsey, 96.
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secularly Muslim, but a sizable minority of Albanians (most of whom live in Albania
proper, not Kosovo) are Albanian Orthodox or Roman Catholic.9 )
Between 1804 and 1817, Serbia was marked by a series of rebellions and
uprisings against the Ottoman Turks, and by 1833, Serbs had achieved a level of
territorial autonomy (albeit still under Ottoman sovereignty) not seen since 1459. 92 In
1877, the Serbs successfully revolted against the weakening Ottoman Empire, and with
the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish War, the 1878 Treaty of San Stefano and Congress
of Berlin granted Serbia fully independent statehood for the first time since Serbia's
incorporation under Ottoman rule. This marks the beginning of the modem Serbian state
and sets the trajectory for the Balkan Alliance93 to issue the Ottoman Empire its final
defeat through the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. It is worth noting that the boundaries of
Serbia in 1878 did not include Kosovo, which remained a vilayet.
The other noteworthy event of 1878 was the first meeting of the League of
Prizren, a political organization through which Albanian representatives from the four
Albanian-populated vilayets met formally to discuss a movement for the unification of all
territories that were home to a substantial number of Albanians-this was the first official
discussion of a 'Greater Albania.' The League of Prizren gave rise to a regiment of
Albanian resistance fighters, but this regiment was shortly crushed by Ottoman forces.
The Balkan Wars are a critical juncture for the region, because they mark the
point at which Balkan peoples were finally able to cast off the yoke of Ottoman
9\ Notably, the Roman Catholic Mother Teresa was an ethnic Albanian, born in FYR Macedonia to
Albanian parents.
92 Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict, (New York: W. W.
Norton & Co., 2000), 174.
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domination. With the Turks out of the Balkans, the region's inhabitants were finally able
to resume their development and attempted to do so at the point at which it was halted by
the Ottoman invasions centuries earlier-this sentiment led to a dramatic push toward the
cultivation of Balkan national identities, as Albanians, Bosnians, Croats, Herzegovinians,
Macedonians, Montenegrins, Slovenes, and Serbs each sought to revive their individual
histories in the memories of their people. This also led to Serbia's formal acquisition of
Kosovo in 1912. Serbia would retain Kosovo throughout the 20th century, and as such, at
no point in Kosovo' s history has it ever existed as an independent state.
Much attention has been focused on the population of Kosovo at the time of its
incorporation as a formal territorial component of Serbia. According to Dempsey, in 1912
the Albanian population within Kosovo was approximately 50%, while Serbs comprised
roughly 25% of the popu1ation.94 But there is wide disagreement here-Spahiu cites
Kema1 Karpat's population analysis, which finds that Kosovo's Serbian population was
less than 2% in 1912 (this is even lower than the current Kosovar Serb population),
suggesting that Kosovo was almost completely dominated by ethnic Albanians.95 By
contrast, according to the Serbian Ministry for Kosovo and Metohija, the population
breakdown at the time was 35% Serbian and 60% Albanian. This is the reverse of the
Ministry's assessment of Kosovo' s population during the late 19th century, which places
the Serb population at 60% and the Albanians' at 35%.96
93 The Balkan Alliance was an outgrowth of the Bulgar-Serb alliance and was fonned in 1911,
consolidating Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro in opposition to the Ottoman Turks.
94 Dempsey, 96.
95 Kemal Karpat, Ottoman Population (/840-1914), (University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), as cited in
Spahiu,21.
96 Serbian Ministry for Kosovo and Metohija, "Kosovo: The Crown of Serbian History" (2006).
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But the absence of concentrated Ottoman authority left a power vacuum in the
region, which descended into chaos and uncertainty before order would be restored. The
assassination of the Austro-Hungarian archduke Franz Ferdinand at the hands of a young
Serb promptly drew the world into the First World War, the aftermath of which would
permanently alter international relations, including the processes by which nations
become states.97
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Aftermath ofthe World Wars: Albania, Yugoslavia, and Tito
After the First World War but before the Paris Peace Conference, the Corfu
Declaration of 1917 decreed that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were to "form a united and
independent state that would be a 'constitutional, democratic, and parliamentary
monarchy headed by the [Serbian] Karadordevic dynasty,',,98 officially founded in 1918
and known as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. This became the First
Yugoslavia, literally translated to "South Slavic land." This amalgamation was short-
lived, as it formally disintegrated in 1941 but actually ceased to function as a codified
state sometime earlier with the rise in Albanian and Croatian fascism, as well as the
Second World War.
Meanwhile, the aftermath of WWI fostered an affirmation by the great powers of
the state of Albania, which had declared independence from the Ottomans in 1912. Since
1912, there had been a strong incentive for Western support of an Albanian state-
97 Pre-WWI: Statehood attained through conquest or trade. Post-WWI: International borders drawn by
Great Powers; statehood attained by designation.
98 Banae, 123.
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Albania was the Ottomans' last claim in Europe, and if the Albanians were defended and
enabled to maintain their own state, the Turks' toehold in Europe would be removed.
This United States-led favor toward the Albanians prevailed in February 1920, when, in
objection to Italian and Greek claims to Albania, Wilson noted that "the United States
was not prepared to do an injustice to the people of Albania," and ensured that Albania's
1913 borders remained intact.99 Albania's claims to Kosovo, though, were largely
ignored.
The Second Yugoslavia-the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia-was
created after World War II under the leadership of Marshal Josip Broz Tito, a half-Croat,
half-Slovene who would rule Yugoslavia from the Serbian capital of Belgrade. Tito's
Yugoslavia was comprised of six constituent republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, and Macedonia) as well as Serbia's provincial
holdings ofVojvodina1oo and Kosovo. Throughout the existence of both Yugoslavias,
Kosovo remained an entity within Serbia and was never accorded the status of republic.
Thus, Serbia was a constituent republic of Yugoslavia, and Kosovo was a constituent
autonomous region within Serbia.
Some historians bring the origins of modern Kosovo to an even lower
denominator- according to Dejan Djokic, "[p]rior to 1946, Kosovo had been a
geographic area with no clear borders. In fact, the 1946 autonomous region was created
,
by a merger of two geographic areas: Kosovo and Metohija (the original name for the
autonomous region, later province, during the socialist period, and the name the Serbian
99 Margaret MacMillan, Peacemakers: The Paris Peace Conference and its Attempt to End War, (London:
John Murray Publishers, Ltd., 2001), 373.
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government will insist upon)."IOI That is to say, the territory that we now commonly
understand to be 'Kosovo' hadn't even been defined as such until 1946.
Again, an examination of Kosovo' s population is warranted. During the interwar
period, Albanians argue that "Serbian authorities attempted to repopulate Kosovo with
Serbs," and as a result of this repopulation movement, "[b]y 1928, the Serb population
had increased to about 38% [an increase of36%], mainly because of the influx of
immigrating Serbs."I02 Although this assessment closely parallels the Serbian Ministry
for Kosovo and Metohija's assessment, the reasons behind Kosovo's population shift
differ depending upon who is asked. Albanians claim that the upsurge of Serbs in Kosovo
is the result of a Serbian 'repopulation' movement; however, Serbs claim that their
population in Kosovo had been steadily declining proportionally because of the
Albanians' traditionally high birth rate in conjunction with a mass influx of Albanians
from Albania proper.
As Djokic alludes, Kosovo entered Tito's Yugoslavia as an 'autonomous region'
under the Yugoslav republic of Serbia. Meanwhile, the population of Kosovo grew
increasingly Albanian, with Serbian estimates attributing a 67% majority to Albanians by
1961. 103 And despite the economic successes of Yugoslavia as a whole, Kosovo has long
been called "the poorhouse of Europe," due to a high birth rate among Albanians in
conjunction with a lack of Yugoslav investment in largely agrarian KosOVO.I04 Indeed,
100 Vojvodina, fonnerly part of Austria-Hungary, was ceded to Serbia after WWI.
101 Dejan Djokic, "For Kosovo, History Depends on Which Historian You Ask," available at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/200S/mar/04Ikosovo.serbia.
102 Spahiu, 21.
103 Serbian Ministry for Kosovo and Metohija, "Kosovo: The Crown of Serbian History," (2006).
104 Christine von Kohl and Wolfgang Libel, "Kosovo: The Gordian Knot of the Balkans," in Robert Elsie,
ed., Kosovo: In the Heart ofthe Powder Keg, (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1997),52.
45
many Serbs believe in a greater Albanian plot to "outbreed" 105 the Serbs, an
understanding that continues to this day.l06 Disparities in perception pervade, as the
words of a Serbian nun at the Gracanica monastery reveal: "Serbia is being bled dry by
these people [the Albanians]. It's a lie that they are poor and unemployed. Why, they list
their dying grandfathers as out of work. They are all smugglers and have lots of foreign
exchange stashed away. They only dress poor and dirty because that is their habit.,,107
The growing majority of Albanians in Kosovo began to agitate for representation
in the local police forces; greater say in local government and administration, and the
availability of Albanian-language newspapers and education. Tito conceded to these
demands, changing the official name of territory from "Kosovo-Metohija" to simply
"Kosovo" in 1968; establishing the University of Pristina (Albanian: Universiteti i
Prishtines) in 1969, and pouring substantial direct investment capital into Kosovo's
manufacturing and industry sectors. 108 These concessions fostered the intensification of
Albanian demands, and by 1974, the Second Yugoslavia's third constitutional revision
granted Kosovo "socialist autonomy," officially declaring Kosovo an 'autonomous
province.' 109 The language here is noteworthy, in that Paragraph 3 explicitly references
105 Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (New York: S1. Martin's Press, 1993),34.
106 In a casual telephone conversation with his mother in Belgrade, a young Serbian male visiting Pristina in
July 2007 remarked that "they [Kosovar Albanian women] are all pregnant, all the time."
107 Kaplan, 34.
108 Kristen P. Williams, Despite Nationalist Conflicts: TheOlY and Practice of Maintaining World Peace,
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 130.
109 Constitution of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, 1974 - Introductory Part: Basic
Principles, Clause 1: "United in their past equally by common life and aspirations for freedom and social
progress, the Albanians, Montenegrins, Muslims, Serbs, Turks, and members of other nations and
nat'ionalities of Yugoslavia in the National Liberation War and socialist revolution, headed by the working
class and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, overthrew the old class system based on exploitation,
political subjugation and national inequality, have found themselves free, equal, and fraternized for the first
time in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, which has become the political and social form of
their close association and mutual equality and their equality with the nations and nationalities of
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the "sovereign rights" of the people of Kosovo, but only "when in the common interests
of the ... Republic [of Serbia] as a whole ..."llo
Meanwhile, many Kosovar Serbs were unsupportive of Tito's fairly liberal
Kosovo policy, and as Kosovar Albanians gained representation and rights within
Kosovo, Kosovar Serbs began to complain of victimization at the hands of the majority
Albanians. Kristen Williams accounts: "Serbs in Kosovo faced threats, land seizures, and
even murder, leading to the significant emigration of Serbs from the territory in the 1970s
and 1980s." III Reports confirming these accusations abound, and in the immediate
aftermath of Tito's Kosovo concessions, Kosovar Albanians were accused of
"...breaking up Serbian and Montenegrin gravestones, defacing the property of the
Orthodox church, and physically assaulting Serbian priests, nuns, and farmers," among
other crimes. I12 Thus, for the Serbs, the psychology of victimhood is not simply mired in
history, the product of a people's excessive fixation on events long since past. Rather,
there are real and recent events that remain vividly etched into the Serbs' collective
memory. I13
Yugoslavia. (Source: Marc Weller, The Crisis in Kosovo 1989 - 1999: From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia
to Rambouillet and the Outbreak of Hostilities, [Cambridge: Documents and Analysis Publishing Ltd.,
1999], 58.)
110 Ibid, Paragraph 3: "The working people and the nations and nationalities of Kosovo shall exercise their
sovereign rights in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo and in the Republic when in the common
interest of the working people, nations and nationalities of the Republic as a whole it is so specified by the
Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, and in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, when
in the common interest it is so specified by the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.
III Williams, 131.
112 Julie Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War, (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1999),22.
113 For more recent examples of such events, see also reprisals against Kosovar Serbs by Kosovar
Albanians after the NATO bombing campaign in 1999.
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Apres Tito, Ie Deluge: Slobodan Milosevic and the 1980s - 90s
Tito, Yugoslavia's self-titled "President for life," died on 4 May 1980, and
Yugoslav political and social stability quickly began to fray along the edges. Rioting
became "a normal part of life," 114 and Kosovar Serbs felt increasingly threatened by the
vociferous Albanian majority. Pristina University found itself at the forefront of the
growing Albanian nationalist movement, and in March 1981, massive protests broke out
in the university student dining hall. These protests featured slogans such as "Kosovo-
Republic," "We are Albanians, not Yugoslavs!" and "We want a unified Albania!,,115
Leaders of the protests, including students and political figures, began to push
aggressively for Yugoslav republic status for Kosovo, or for annexation of Kosovo by
Albania. This sparked a series of riots that spread throughout Kosovo that were regularly
met with tear gas and Serbian military police. On the riots, a Serbian woman from
Kosovska Mitrovica remembers, "Weren't we all taught that we are supposed to live
together? I was very hurt and disappointed and that, unfortunately, resulted in my hatred
against them for they betrayed me. I couldn't understand the real reason why they didn't
want to live with us anymore. It was probably because Albanians had all the rights at the
time, all the power. They say, 'Give somebody power to see what is he like,' and that was
Serb-Albanian tensions mounted throughout the 1980s, and on 24 April 1987,
then-President of the Presidium of the Serbian League of Communists Slobodan
Milosevi6 travelled from Belgrade to Pristina to address Kosovar Serbs' concerns. On a
114 Kaplan, 45.
115 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 40.
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visit to Kosovo Polje, a crowd of approximately 15,000 Kosovar Serbs came to hear
MiloseviC's address and were met with local Albanian police. 117 When the Serbs began to
complain that Albanians were throwing rocks at the Serbs, engaging in provocative
behavior, and 'beating them,' Milosevi6 paused in his speech and said, simply, "No one
will beat you again." I 18 For the Serbs, this moment is profoundly significant because it
signified a "[pledge] to help the suffering of the Kosovar Serbs." But the Serbs are
careful to note, "[a]t that time-and then only-[Milosevi6] had the support of the entire
population."119 For Kosovar Albanians, this was an entirely different moment, as
Milosevi6 capitalized on the feelings of victimization and'dormarit 'nationalism of the
Serbs in an attempt to catapult himself to the forefront of Yugoslav politics using
whatever mechanisms were most useful-including the subjugation of other nationalities.
Later that year, Milosevi6 ascended to the presidency of Serbia.
1989 marked the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, and this event
provided Milosevi6 with the ideal opportunity to consolidate his power amongst the
Serbs. Robert Kaplan captures the Serbian sentiment of 1989: "While 1989 will be
remembered by other peoples as the year when the Cold War ended and the Communist
system collapsed, for. .. 8.55 million Serbs, 1989 signified something altogether different:
the six hundredth anniversary of their defeat.,,12o As such, it is readily apparent why and
how a nationalist politician such as Milosevi6 was so quickly welcomed-wanted,
perhaps even needed-by the Serbian people. Sealing the deal, in 1989 Milosevi6
116 Mertus, 64.
117 Weller, 15.
118 Philip E. Auerswald and David P. Auerswald, eds., The Kosovo Conflict: A Diplomatic History through
Documents, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 4.
119 Serbian Ministry for Kosovo and Metohija, "Kosovo: The Crown of Serbian History," (2006).
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orchestrated the nullification of the 1974 Yugoslav constitutional revisions and revoked
Kosovo's autonomy, rolling back all of the concessions that Tito had made to the
majority Albanian population.
The changes enacted by Milosevi6 visibly and radically altered daily life in
Kosovo. All education, from primary to university levels, was to be conducted in the
Serbian language only, and Albanian newspapers, books, and other publications were
banned. Pristina University remained at the center of the conflict, as Kosovar Albanian
professors were removed from the university and their jobs given to Serbian professors.
Additionally, Albanian doctors and nurses were no longer permitted to work at the main
hospital in Pristina, and healthcare service providers eventually became exclusively
Serbs. Furthermore, Albanian local police were fired and replaced by Serbian military
police. MiloseviC's crackdown on Albanians in Kosovo prompted the founding of the
Democratic Forum of Kosovo, whose purpose was to establish "the sovereignty of
Kosovo as a constitutive entity of the Yugoslav community of equal standing with its
other entities.,,121 On 2 July 1990, the Kosovo Assembly issued a Declaration of
Independence, resulting in a suspension of the Kosovo Assembly by the Serbian
Assembly. In September 1991, Kosovar Albanians conducted a "semi-underground"
referendum, and 99.87% ofvoters cast their ballots in favor of an independent Republic
of Kosova. 122 However, this vote fell on deaf ears around the world with the singular
exception of Albania, who was the only country in the world to offer Kosovo diplomatic
\20 Kaplan, 35.
\2\ Auerswald, 6.
\22 Ibid, 7; also, Weller, 17.
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recognition. At this time, according to the 1991 Kosovo Census, the population of
Kosovo was 82.2% Albanian and 9.9% Serbian. 123
Despite the efforts of the Serbs, Kosovar Albanians began to develop an
underground parallel state led by political moderate and co-founder of the Democratic
League of Kosovo (LDK) Ibrahim Rugova. Through Rugova's "phantom state,,,124 a
network of Albanian doctors, nurses, professors, and teachers who had lost their jobs as a
result of the crackdown were able to offer their services in basements, garages, and
seldom-travelled back alleys. But beyond services, Rugova and the LDK created "a
whole simulated government structure," complete with a president and parliament. 125 The
phantom state's phantom government continued to develop in scope and sophistication
throughout the 1990s, but it lacked a military component, partially as a result of the
decidedly pacifistic Rugova's reliance on passive resistance.
In 1996, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA; Albanian: Ushtria <;lirimtare e
Kosoves, or U<;K) emerged under the leadership of Hashim Thayi as the violent arm of
the Kosovar Albanians' nationalist-separatist movement. A classic guerilla paramilitary
organization that was officially designated a terrorist group by the U.S. State Department,
the KLA was formed in part due to the lack of results that Rugova's parallel state was
achieving. By the mid-1990s, four of the six Yugoslav republics (Slovenia, Croatia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia) had gained independence, but Kosovo's call for
self-determination had been largely ignored by the international community.
\23 Kosovo Census Data as presented in Mertus, 316.
124 Judah, 61.
125 Ibid, 68.
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The actual intentions of the KLA have been the subject of much debate-Dempsey
contends that the KLA's intention was "to trigger secession of the predominantly ethnic
Albanian Kosovo province from the Yugoslav state.,,126 Others suggest that the KLA's
"covert agenda was to 'ethnically cleanse' Kosovo of Serbs and other minorities," 127 and
,
still others suggest that the true aim of the KLA was to free Kosovo from Serbia and then
to create a 'Greater Albania,' uniting Albania proper, Kosovo, and the Albanian-
populated parts of Macedonia-Misha Glenny finds that, "Albanians could, for the first
time, make out the contours ofa Greater Albania.,,128 Regardless of the KLA's intentions,
its tactics served to confirm the Serbian peoples' victimization mentality, as the KLA
engaged in drive-by shootings; seemingly random assaults on Serbs in cafes and
restaurants; killing Serbian policemen; an attack on the Serbian Rector of Pristina
University, and massive stockpiling of weapons that foreshadowed larger-scale attacks.
These attacks were designed to provoke reprisals, which would in turn instigate
additional action on the part of the Kosovar Albanians and rally support for the KLA. 129
Furthermore, because the KLA was very much a reaction to the moderate stance of
Rugova and the LDK, the KLA also targeted moderate Kosovar Albanians who did not
share in the objectives of the KLA-Albanians who did not support violent secession, or
who were employed in Serbian public services (e.g. police inspectors, forest service
workers, postal employees, and public utility workers) were assassinated by the KLA as
126 Dempsey, 94.
\27 Nigel Thomas and Krunoslav Mikulan, The Yugoslav Wars (2): Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, 1992
- 200 I, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2006), 47.
\28 Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804 - 1999 (New York:
Penguin, 1999), 656-57.
129 Michael Parenti, To Kill a Nation: The Attack on Yugoslavia, (London: Verso, 2000), 99.
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"collaborators.,,13o This allowed the KLA to completely permeate Kosovo as a grassroots
movement, prompting the slogan, "We are all U<;K."
Violence escalated as the KLA became better armed and better organized, and
Serbian military forces responded such that by the late 1990s, a full-scale war between
the KLA and Serbian forces was underway. By 1998, the international community could
no longer ignore the situation in Kosovo, and after a protracted round of international
diplomacy and sanctions against Serbia, the Contact Group, comprised of the United
States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia, called for a peace
conference at Rambouillet, France in early 1999. The Contact Group invited
representatives of the Milosevic government as well as KLA leadership to participate in
the talks, a move that grossly limited their potential effectiveness-with KLA leadership
at the bargaining table, Milosevic had little incentive to yield to Western pressures. The
Contact Group devised the Rambouillet Peace Agreement and secured its acceptance by
the KLA, but not the Serbs. Upon the Serbs' refusal to agree to the terms of Rambouillet,
NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana authorized airstrikes against Serbia beginning on
24 March 1999.
The NATO bombing campaign served several purposes: one, it reinforced the
KLA's commitment to its cause-self-determination via secession for Kosovo. Because
NATO was willing to intervene on behalf of the Kosovar Albanians, this lent credence to
their movement and effectively indicated that the international community would perhaps
support their push toward independence, regardless of what Serbia had to say about it.
But secondarily, the NATO airstrikes also intensified the Serbs' campaign against the
130 Ibid. 53
Kosovar Albanians, triggering a massive European refugee crisis that threatened to
destabilize the region all over again as hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians crossed
the border of Kosovo into Macedonia.
Seventy-eight days after it began, NATO issued a ceasefire as Milosevi6
surrendered on 3 June 1999. One week later, the United Nations (UN) passed Security
Council Resolution 1244, which established the United Nations Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), a four-pillared international peacekeeping and
administration mission that was the first of its kind. It delegated responsibilities to three
international organizations-the UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), and the European Union (EU)-and operates in parallel with NATO's
military peacekeeping operation, the Kosovo Protection Force (KFOR). However,
UNSCR-1244 did not grant the KLA's foremost demand-an independent Kosovo.
Rather, it created what has been termed "Europe's most famous non-country," a
territorial entity that has existed somewhat in limbo since 1999. 131 Since the end of the
war, Kosovar Albanians have continued to push for independent statehood, while
Kosovar Serbs remain hopeful that Kosovo's final status will involve keeping Kosovo
within Serbia's borders. The 17 February 2008 declaration of independence by the
Kosovar Albanian parliament has had a lukewarm reception from the international
community, and has been annulled by the Serbian government. Thus, despite this
proclamation of independence, UNMIK continues normal operations in Kosovo in
conjunction with a new EU-Ied mission, EULEX, and Kosovo's final status remains
131 Whit Mason, "Kosovo: Unraveling the Knot," World Policy Journal (22 September 2006). Available at:
http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/giOI99-6062624/Kosovo-unraveling-the-knot.htm1.
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uncertain. The international community has yet to reach consensus upon the issues of
whether an independent Kosovo is a fundamental violation of Serbian territorial
sovereignty; whether Milosevi6-era Serbian offenses merit a violation of Serbian
territorial sovereignty in retribution for these offenses, or whether historical grievances
suffered by both parties should play any role at all in determining the future outcome of
the conflict.
COMPETING CLAIMS TO Kosovo
The Kosovar Albanian Case for SelfDetermination, Secession, and Statehood
The history surrounding the Kosovo conflict presents several compelling reasons
why Kosovar Albanians should be allowed to invoke the principle of self-determination
in their quest for sovereign statehood. These include the role of ancient history
(Albanians are descended from the original inhabitants of Kosovo); current population
(Kosovo is 90-95% ethnically Albanian; therefore, why should a tiny majority of Serbs
be allowed to override the wishes of the majority?), and recent history, which suggests
that because Kosovar Albanians have been the victims of egregious violations under the
Milosevi6 regime, Serbs have lost their claim to Kosovo. Put simply, the argument goes
that the Serbian government's policy in Kosovo during the 1980s and 90s was so
inexcusable that Kosovo can never again be under the authority of Belgrade.
However, each of these reasons is problematic. With regard to ancient history,
there is no definitive proof that Albanians are directly descended from the Illyrians, and
even ifthey were, relying strictly on the 'who was there first' qualification invites a
plethora of slippery slopes-for example, who inhabited the United States first, European
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colonists or Native Americans? The United States has determined that much of its
territory 'belonged' to the Native Americans prior to the arrival of European colonists,
and that these European settlers acquired territory by seizing it from the Native
Americans. As a result, the government of the United States has put in place a series of
restitutions to the Native Americans, including establishing the Department of the
Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs, which oversees the limited sovereignty afforded
Native Americans through reservations and other special status privileges. But what if
there was a group who inhabited the United States' territory prior to the Native
Americans? What is the present-day Native Americans' obligation to their predecessors?
Furthermore, what of California, Arizona, New Mexico, or Texas? These states were
onc"e part of Mexico, and at various points in history, they also belonged to Spanish
colonists. To whom do these states rightfully belong? Clearly, basing one's claims to a
territory on historical ownership introduces a host of new challenges.
Next, there is the issue of current population. It is true that Kosovo is
overwhelmingly dominated by one ethnic group, the Albanians, and that this population
imbalance is likely to continue in favor of the Albanians given the group's
characteristically high birthrate. However, Kosovo is also home to several other
ethnicities, including Serbs, Turks, Roma, Ashkali, Egyptians,132 Bosniaks, and
Gorani. 133 Are not each of these is entitled to the same principle of self-determination as
the others? Yet the demands for an independent Kosovo are almost entirely the domain of
Kosovar Albanians, and most Serbs, RAE, and Muslim Slavs do not support a break from
132 Henceforth, 'RAE' shall refer to Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians.
133 Henceforth, 'Muslim Slavs' shall include both Bosniaks and Gorani.
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Serbia. If a referendum on independence were to take place with one vote granted to each
ethnic group, Kosovar Albanians would almost certainly be in the minority.
Additionally, there is the question of what role recent history should play. One
finds little doubt that the Milosevic regime perpetrated egregious offenses, but it is worth
noting that a vast majority of Serbs would be the first to agree with the point-Milosevic,
whose nationalist appeal initially won him wide support among Serbs, had fallen from
grace after the wars in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia. By 1997, Milosevic had lost
support even among the Serbs, who had begun organizing student demonstrations against
the regime in conjunction with the Serbian Orthodox Church, which had accused
Milosevic of "ballot stuffing, setting Serbs against Serbs, and undermining religious
freedoms.,,134 In the aftermath of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the Serbian war machine
had been bled dry, and many Serbs-particularly those who had served in the earlier
wars-did not want to fight another war. Journalist and legal scholar Samantha Power
puts it this way: "[the Serbs] did not want to die for Kosovo, and they certainly did not
want to die for Milosevic.,,135 Thus, to base an international judgment ofKosovo's future
status on the acts of the Milosevic regime without regard for other extenuating
circumstances would be to punish an entire people for the acts of a tyrant who did not
represent the people-as Serbian Foreign Minster Vuk Jeremic remarked shortly after
Kosovo's declaration of independence, "Recognizing Kosovo [as an independent state]
means saying, in effect, that Serbian democracy must be punished because a tyrant-one
who committed heinous deeds against the Kosovo Albanians in the 1990s-was left
134 Weller, The Crisis in Kosovo 1989- 1999, 20.
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unpunished. Such misplaced revenge may make some feel better, but it will make the
. . I . ~ I h ,,136mternatlOna commumty lee muc worse.
The Serbian Claim to Kosovo
Taking a step back now to look at Kosovo from the Serbian perspective, there are
again numerous reasons upon which the case can be made that Kosovo should remain
integral to Serbia, and that Serbian territorial sovereignty should trump any nationalist-
separatists' right to self-determination in Kosovo. These reasons include medieval
history; national identity; spiritual identity (threatened by Kosovar Albanian vandals who
have desecrated Serbian Orthodox Churches); population issues (for example, if the
wishes of all Serbs in Serbia proper as well as Kosovo were taken into account, a vast
majority of Serbs would oppose independence for Kosovo); recent history (Albanians in
Kosovo have shown what they will do with autonomy-they will victimize non-
Albanians); nationality issues (Albanians already have a state-Albania), and
international norms (Serbia has an expectation of territorial inviolability based on the
Westphalian notion of sovereignty).
But, like the Kosovar Albanian case for statehood, these claims are problematic as
well. First, with regard to medieval history, centuries-old Serbian claims to Kosovo are
just as easily discounted as the Albanians' reliance on ancient Illyria as sufficient
justification for their claim to the territory. Similarly, complications arise from an
overreliance on Kosovo' s role in the Serbian national and spiritual identity-although the
135 Samantha Power, A Problemfi'om Hell: America and the Age ofGenocide, (New York: Basic Books,
2002),459.
136 Vuk Jeremic, "One Nation, Indivisible," The New York Times, 27 February 2008.
58
importance of these factors certainly should not be undervalued, neither should the
importance of Kosovo to the (nascent) Kosovar Albanian national identity.
Next, there are population issues. Despite Kosovo's history as an integral part of
Serbia, its majority population of ethnic Albanians has made Kosovo today a
fundamentally different place from Serbia. Upon entering Kosovo from Serbia proper,
the first thing that one notices is that the language on the signs of roads and businesses
has changed from Serbian to almost uniformly Albanian (with the exception of an
occasional few street signs in both languages, the Albanian version listed first). In
Kosovo's largest cities, mosques are ubiquitous fixtures, and in Pristina, the only Serbian
Orthodox Church that remains is an unfinished concrete shell that stands across from the
University of Pristina's National Library-the church was commissioned by Milosevic,
but never completed. Serbian dinars are not accepted currency anywhere except for the
Serbian enclaves; in the rest of Kosovo, the euro is the official currency. Outside of the
enclaves, Serbian products are not available in the markets and stores; rather, one might
purchase Austrian, Slovenian, or Turkish goods. The Albanian national flag is
omnipresent. Kosovo is visibly dominated by ethnic Albanians, who have defined the
territory linguistically and culturally. As such, regardless of what Serbs in Belgrade, Nis,
or Novi Sad might prefer, most of Kosovo is a strikingly different place from Serbia, and
in light of this, to continue to treat Kosovo as if it were still Serbia is to perpetuate what
Chaim Gans calls the "political inferiority" of Kosovo's majority population, the Kosovar
Albanians. 13? Therefore, despite legal precedent and theoretical argumentation that
137 Chaim Gans, "Historical Rights: The Evaluation of Nationalist Claims to Sovereignty," Political TheOlY
Vol. 29, No. I, (February 2001),69.
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suggests that all citizens within a state should have a say in the secession of a part of their
country,138 perhaps Serbs who do not live in Kosovo should not have the right to
determine the political future of the Albanians who do live in Kosovo. On this, Philpott
surmises: "A right to decide whether another self can enjoy self-determination would
make a mockery of the concept. .. , Allowing this would be like allowing the English to
vote on the independence of the American colonies, the Iraqi Sunnis to decide the fate of
Iraqi Kurds or Shiites, or the Soviet Union that of the Lithuanians.,,139
This leads again to the debate over what role recent historical grievances should
play in determining Kosovo's status, and in applying this assessment to other similar
conflicts. Philpott contends that, "a group which denies some of its members any
semblance of freedom cannot be allowed self-determination.,,14o This is the background
to Elizabeth Pond's claim that Serbs have "forfeited their ancestral heartland of Kosovo
through their brutality against the majority Albanians there in the 1990s,,,141 an argument
that many have made in support of a right to self-determination for the Kosovar
Albanians. The argument, as spelled out by Philpott, stipulates that "a group threatened
with genocide by the larger state or a third party against whom the state cannot defend
has a strengthened right of self-determination, just as a state, in just-war theory, has a
138 In 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada found that Quebec did not have a right to secede from Canada if
the majority of all Canadian voters did not support Quebec's secession. Along this vein, Brilmayer writes,
"In consulting the population of the entire state, one might find that a majority overall wished to remain a
single country. What has not been explained is why only the separatists need consulting" (Brilmayer, 185).
139 Philpott, "In Defense of Self-Determination," 363.
140 Ibid, 375. Of course, one might also note that this is similarly applicable to the behavior of Kosovar
Albanians toward the Kosovar Serb minority.
141 Elizabeth Pond, "Kosovo and Serbia after the French Non," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No.4
(Autumn 2005), 22.
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right to self-defense.,,142 As such, the justification for the Kosovar Albanian self-
determination movement is self-defense.
One final complication to Serbian claims to Kosovo lies with the issue of
international norms. Given the above discussion of self-defense through self-
determination, it stands to reason that even if the creation of an independent Kosovo
without Serbian consent is a violation of international norms, are not such violations
excusable, contingent upon circumstances? After all, would it be preferable to "adhere to
international norms that would protect the integrity of the Serbian state at the expense of
Kosovar Albanians' lives? The answer to this question would be simple, ifnot for the fact
that the lives of Kosovar Albanians have not been the only ones at risk throughout the
conflict-Kosovar Serbs have also suffered heavy losses as a result of the conflict, both
before and after the international community's intervention. 143
How Ought We to Respond to Historical Grievances?
Because the Kosovo conflict is so entangled in historical disputes and factual
ambiguities, it is exceptionally difficult (as the international community has so recently
demonstrated) to determine whose claims are justified and which party should end up on
the losing end of a territorial conflict-in this case, who should 'lose' Kosovo.
Brilmayer finds that there are two main arguments that can be used to determine
or demonstrate that secessionists' (in this case, the Kosovar Albanians ') claims are
142 Philpott, "In Defense of Self-Determination," 378.
143 After UNMIK and NATO arrived in Kosovo in 1999, violence against Kosovar Albanians was largely
curtailed, but reprisals against Kosovar Serbs became commonplace. Serbs claim that NATO was only
interested in enforcing the protection of the Albanians, but when Serbs were being victimized, KFOR
soldiers looked the other way. Other reports suggest that NATO was unofficially instructed to allow
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legitimate-that is, that the secessionists have a right to secede. The first is based on an
understanding that "the land was acquired through conquest by the state from which the
ethnic group wishes to secede," and in these cases, "[t]he wrongdoer is ... the currently
dominant state" (in this case, Serbia). 144 This applies to Kosovo only if it is true that the
ancient Illyrians are the direct predecessors of the modern Kosovar Albanians, a claim
that, as discussed earlier in this chapter, is uncertain. If the invading Slavs of the 4th - i h
centuries had in fact displaced the Illyrians from Kosovo, and if the Illyrians really are
the ancestors of the Kosovar Albanians, then this claim could be valid-but then again,
the Illyrians were not Albanians themselves, so this invites quite the slippery slope.
Furthermore, as Spahiu points out, the ancestry is too distant to claim primacy. 145 Spahiu
makes a compelling case for focusing on recent history, but as we have seen, recent
history does not offer any clearer answers-if anything, recent history highlights that
responsibility shared by the Serbs and the Kosovar Albanians.
Brilmayer's second argument is perhaps more applicable to Kosovo, centering on
"a wrongdoing committed by a third party." 146 She elaborates: "At some previous point in
history, a state with no current stake in the dispute improperly joined the territories of the
currently dominant state and the separatist group. This type of wrongdoing occurred
when the European colonial powers fixed colonial borders to suit their own convenience,
and then left the borders intact when their empires receded.,,147 One might find that this
applies to the Kosovo case in that Kosovo has repeatedly been lumped in with Serbia
Kosovar Albanians to loot Serbian shops without penalty in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, as
'appeasement. '
144 Brilmayer, 190.
145 Spahiu, 25.
146 Brilmayer, 190.
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proper-during the period of Ottoman rule, it was included in the Ottoman Empire; then,
with the creation of the modern Serbian state and the decline of the Ottomans, it was
transferred from Ottoman vilayet to Serbian territory. Finally, throughout the creation of
the first and second Yugoslavias, Kosovo remained a formal part of Serbia. Kosovo was
never a republic in its own right, but rather was always part of Serbia, vacillating between
being classified a 'region' and a 'province.' Of course, the applicability of Brilmayer's
argument is debatable; in that one might point out that there was no wrongdoing by any
third party by including Kosovo as a territorial component of Serbia, because Kosovo
always was Serbia (at least, according to the Serbs). Furthermore, one might also point
out that all of the wrongdoings of the conflict were perpetrated not by third parties at all,
but by the primary actors-Serbs and Albanians.
Clearly, history does not offer a satisfactory answer to the question ofKosovo's
rightful ownership, and the relevant literature offers no simple solution. This is especially
complicated by the argument that secession is permissible when it is undertaken as a
punishment against an offending state (e.g. MiloseviC's Serbia). Chapter 3 will discuss
contemporary complications that arise from attempting to discern a straightforward
solution to the Kosovo case, focusing in particular on issues of collective punishment,
viability, sustainability, and protecting the human rights of all nationalities within
Kosovo.
147 Ibid.
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CHAPTER 3 - COMPLICATIONS
The complications that arise from a close examination of the history surrounding
the Kosovo conflict illustrate why the conflict has yet to be resolved. This is what makes
the Kosovo case so challenging, and on a broader level, it is what makes many
nationalist-separatist conflicts so intractable--one cannot simply review the facts to
discern who are the guilty parties, who are the victims, and who should be responsible for
implementing a solution. For this reason, a solution has yet to be found despite a war
between the KLA and the Serbs in the late 1990s; the NATO-led war in 1999; nearly nine
years of international peacekeeping by the UN, the OSeE, and the ED under UNMIK;
also nearly nine years of post-war NATO military peacekeeping under KFOR, and
finally, two years of multilateral status negotiations. But beyond examining
complications from the perspectives of the principle actors, also consider viability and
sustainability. Additional complications arise when viability becomes a factor, and
Kosovo's viability as an independent, fully sovereign (that is, both internally and
externally) state is questionable at best. These issues, in conjunction with competing
historical grievances, are why Kosovo cannot simply transition to an independent state,
but why it also cannot return to the previous model of Serbian administration. These
conditions highlight the urgent need for the relationship between self-determination and
sovereignty to take on a new model.
Questions of viability and sustainability are perhaps the most difficult
complications that arise from recognizing a right to self-determination via statehood in
Kosovo, because even if Kosovo does attain juridical sovereignty through diplomatic
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recognition, empirical sovereignty remains out of Kosovo' s reach for the foreseeable
future. Post-war reconstruction efforts in Kosovohave made measurable progress, but
there is still much work to be done, particularly in developing sound, sustainable political
and economic mechanisms. This begs the question-if raison d'etat is the state itself, and
if Kosovo is not yet a viable state, is 'independence' premature at best, or self-defeating
at worst? An unviable or unsustainable state of Kosovo introduces the very real
possibility that this version of self-determination would actually be to the detriment of all
Kosovars, not just ethnic minorities. Put differently, issues of viability in Kosovo could
defeat the very purpose of the Kosovar Albanians' drive toward independence.
NEWBORN OR STILLBORN? VIABILITY AND SUSTAINABILITY IN Kosovo
Upon Kosovo's declaration of independence, a large statue of the word
"NEWBORN" was unveiled in the center of Pristina. Skeptics promptly seized upon the
opportunity to question whether a 'newborn' Kosovo would actually be 'stillborn,'
arguing that even if Kosovo' s declaration of independence is recognized widely, Kosovo
would hardly be independent-Graham Bowley of the New Yark Times calls
independence "an exaggeration," suggesting that Kosovo is in actuality "declaring
something a lot like dependence.,,148 Instead, Kosovo's latest incarnation would more
closely resemble what Robert Jackson calls a "quasi-state;" that is, a state that "do[es] not
disclose the empirical constituents by which real states are ordinarily recognized.,,149
Characteristics of quasi-states include uncertain state authority; ineffective government
148 Graham Bowley, "Declaring Something a Lot Like Dependence," The New York Times, 2 March 2008.
149 Robert H. Jackson, "Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence
and the Third World," International Organization, Vol. 41, No.4 (Autumn 1987),526.
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organizations that are plagued by corruption, and an ethnically segmented political
community whose effect is to "confuse political obligation almost fatally.,,15o Although
UNMIK has made significant progress in developing Kosovo's economy, political
institutions, and infrastructure, Kosovo remains at an inchoate stage of development and
faces a number of challenges before it will be capable of escaping the role of the quasi-
state and sustaining itself without substantial international administrative assistance.
Political Structure and Governance
Kosovo's present political structure is an adaptation of Rugova's underground
parallel state structures, supported largely through the first three ofUNMIK's four pillars.
Pillar I, Police and Justice, and Pillar II, Civil Administration, are both upheld directly by
UNMIK. Pillar III, Democratization and Institution Building, falls under the purview of
the OSCE, and so since 1999, the OSCE has worked to develop Kosovo's Provisional
Institutions of Self-Government (PISG). These include the President of Kosovo, the
Legislative Assembly, the courts, and other government institutions. The President,
currently Fatmir Sejdiu (LDK), is elected by the Assembly and serves a five-year term.
The 120-seat Assembly is deliberately multiethnic, with only 100 of its seats open to
general election. The remaining twenty seats are reserved for proportional representation
of members of specific ethnic groups within Kosovo-ten seats are reserved for Kosovar
Serbs; four for RAE; three for Bosniaks; two for Turks, and one for a Goran
representative. The Assembly elects Kosovo's Prime Minister, currently Hashim Thavi.
150 Ibid, 527.
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Thac;i is a member of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), the official party of the
KLA and the main opposition to Rugova and current President Sejdiu's party, the LDK.
One ofKFOR's main priorities in Kosovo has been disarming the KLA and
converting it to a civilian police force, the Kosovo Police Service (KPS). Although the
KPS is officially a multiethnic force, its officers are predominantly Kosovar Albanians,
and the few Serbian KPS officers have been intimidated into not reporting for duty since
Kosovo's declaration of independence. One of the KPS's main priorities is to provide
protection to ethnic minorities in Kosovo and to prevent interethnic violence; however, it
is difficult to envision former members of the KLA engaged in the defense of Serbs who
were so recently identified as enemies in war. It is even more difficult to imagine that
Kosovar Serbs, most of whom live in isolated, rural enclaves scattered throughout
Kosovo, are entirely willing to put their trust in former KLA members for their protection
from other Albanians. This seeming conflict of interests is present in higher levels of
government, as well-the current Prime Minister of Kosovo is a former leader of the
KLA, as were the two previous PISG Prime Ministers, Agim <;eku and Ramush
Haradinaj.151 It stretches credulity to suggest that Kosovar Serbs will be able to willingly
commit themselves to a government whose leadership once held top posts in the KLA.
151 Adding yet another layer to the challenge of separating current Kosovar political leaders present-day
roles from their past KLA involvement, former Kosovo Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj was recently
acquitted of war crimes stemming from his role in the KLA at the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, Netherlands. Haradinaj was the first ethnic Albanian indicted by
the ICTY, but the verdict has sparked renewed skepticism over the impartiality of the tribunal, which held
that the KLA was responsible for war crimes during the Kosovo war, but that the indicted individuals from
KLA leadership ranks were not.
67
Economics
Kosovo's economic sector faces three major challenges: attracting foreign direct
investment (FDI), upholding standards of accountability/competing with the black market
and organized crime, and high rates of unemployment. Kosovars (Serbs and Albanians
alike) tend to blame Kosovo's lack ofFDI on the unresolved status issue-partially
because investment in a non-state is an inherently risky venture, and also because
investing in Kosovo might be perceived as an affront to Belgrade, and many foreign
investors are not willing to make such a political statement. As such, Kosovo finds it very
difficult to attract investments that will help to fortify domestic production and industry.
And even though Kosovo has declared independence, this does not remove the political
statement that investing in Kosovo makes to Belgrade-as such, foreign investment
remains slow to arrive in Kosovo.
Upholding accountability standards and addressing organized crime are an even
greater challenge. Kosovo is home to thriving black and gray markets, and all layers of
society are nearly saturated with organized criminal activity. As a result of this, much of
Kosovo's economic activity is conducted off the record, and this also makes it difficult to
secure investments with which to develop the Kosovo economy. Kosovo is a cash
economy and has not yet developed sophisticated national banking services. Furthermore,
there are two currencies in circulation in Kosovo: the euro, and the Serbian dinar, the
I
latter of which is accepted only in the enclaves (but is often the only currency accepted in
the enclaves). The refusal of Kosovar Serbs to participate in the Kosovo economy also
makes accountability exceptionally difficult.
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Kosovo's cafes are constantly full of young people who often spend whole days
in cafes, paying 50 euro cents per day to drink macchiato with other young, jobless, but
often educated Kosovars. Unemployment is easily the greatest economic hurdle for
Kosovo, home to Europe's youngest population (again, due to a very high birthrate
among the Albanian population) and also the highest rate of unemployment in Europe,
hovering now around 43%. This dearth ofjobs is triggered partially by the lack of
investment in Kosovo's industrial sector, most of which is outdated and extremely
inefficient. Even if Kosovo were to become fully independent, rampant unemployment
would still plague Kosovo, and this would result in a state with a very young population
having little productive activity in which to engage-thereby increasing the likelihood of
involvement in criminal activity, including arms dealing, drug smuggling, and trafficking
in persons, Kosovo's three major illicit activities.
As an aside, there is an optimistic flip side to Kosovo's declaration of
independence, should Serbia choose to accept it-that Serbia is actually gaining its
independence from politically underdeveloped, economically stunted Kosovo, which
should free Serbia to focus on its own political and economic development.
Daily Life - Electricity and Water
Prior to Kosovo' s declaration of independence, popular sentiment among Kosovar
Albanians suggested that all of the inconveniences and obstacles to daily life in Kosovo
would be erased once Kosovo's final status had been determined. Even though nine years
have passed since the end of the war, Kosovo is still affected by chronic utilities
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shortages. The two main utility issues are the availability of electricity, and access to
clean water.
Despite years of internationally-led efforts to improve production and efficiency in
power generation, Kosovo is still not able to generate enough electricity to ensure
constant power availability for all of Kosovo and must rely on imported electricity from
neighboring states. This is mostly due to the fact that Kosovo has one aging power plant,
run by the Kosovo Energy Corporation (Albanian: Korporata Energjetike e Kosoves, or
KEK), and is unable to draw in foreign investment to improve its antiquated, inefficient
power generation facilities. Furthermore, Kosovo is at risk of running out of lignite coal
to supply its power plant, and current estimates suggest that Kosovo will 'run out' of
electricity around 2010 if the situation does not change. 152 Currently, Kosovo' s electricity
is distributed by regional areas, with assigned on/off schedules-for example, Kosovo' s
most rural areas are typically on a 3:3 schedule, with three hours of electricity followed
by three hours without. 153 Few areas in Kosovo enjoy uninterrupted electricity, a
characteristic that is hardly the hallmark of a functional European state. Moreover,
Kosovar Serbs tend to live in the most rural areas of Kosovo, which means that most
Kosovar Serbs have the worst access to electricity in Kosovo.
Access to clean water is another major issue in Kosovo, due partially to
abnormally low precipitation contributing to reduced reservoir stores, but also due to a
lack of conservation efforts. It is a common custom in Kosovo to wash the sidewalks
152 "EU Urges Kosovo to Move Ahead with Power Project," Reuters UK, 4 April 2008. Available at:
http://uk.reuters.com/mticle/oilRptiidUKL04831 07420080404.
153 Kosovo Energy Corporation Daily Report, II April 2008. Available at: http://www.kek-
energy.com/kek-cmnPg.jsp?mlD=203&cat= 181 &1=2.
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outside of one's business or residence daily, and although the PISG have acknowledged,
that this is a waste of water and have made washing sidewalks an offense punishable by
moderate fines, there is no enforcement, and Kosovars continue to wash their sidewalks
daily. This lack of capacity-or will-for law enforcement reflects poorly upon the
PISG's commitment to effective self-governance, and water rationing is standard
practice. 154 It remains to be seen whether a final status resolution will solve these
problems.
Regional Repercussions
An independent state of Kosovo threatens to destabilize the former Yugoslav
region, especially in countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, and Serbia.
Republika Srpska, the de facto Serbian republic within Bosnia-Herzegovina, has had a
keen eye trained on Kosovo for some time, and despite UNMIK Special Representative
to the Secretary-General (SRSG) Joachim Rucker's repeated insistence that Kosovo is a
wholly unique case that could not possibly set a precedent for Republika Srpska,155 Serbs
in Republika Srpska have suggested that, "Kosovo's independence created a precedent in
international affairs that would allow...Republika Srpska to follow SUit.,,156
Ramifications have already spread to FYR Macedonia, home to a sizeable minority
(roughly 25%) of ethnic Albanians who are part of a tenuous government coalition
between Macedonian parties and the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA). Shortly after
154 In most areas of Kosovo, unless a water tank has been installed on the property, no water will be
available from 10 or I I PM until 5 or 6 AM daily, and in some elevated areas, water is also unavailable for
several hours midday.
155 Remarks from the SRSG at the University of Pristina, 16 July 2007.
156 "Bosnia Remains Calm but Tense over Kosovo Independence," Balkan Insight, 17 February 2008.
Available at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/7969/.
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the Kosovo declaration, Macedonia's government collapsed and only recently
reconstituted itself with the understanding that new parliamentary elections would be
held in the near future. The mass influx of ethnic Albanians"to Macedonia as a
repercussion of the war in Kosovo has disrupted Macedonia's ethnic balance, and
Albanians in Macedonia have begun to petition for things such as the addition of
Albanian as an official language of Macedonia; Albanian-language primary education,
and dedicated Albanian television stations.
Finally, recent events in Serbia have provided the most prominent example of the
regional repercussions of an independent state of Kosovo, as the fragile Serbian coalition
government has collapsed, Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica has resigned and called for
emergency parliamentary elections on 11 May, and upset Serbs have organized a massive
protest in Belgrade on 21 February that later degenerated into an attack on the U.S. and
British embassies, leaving one protester (a Kosovar Serb who had fled Kosovo during the
war) dead. Violence also erupted in the divided city of Kosovska Mitrovica, a
longstanding flashpoint of the Kosovo conflict.
A Return to Violence?
Recent events in North Mitrovica are signs of the worst-case scenario-prolonged
violence in northern Kosovo. Kosovska Mitrovica, sometimes described as Kosovo's
Berlin, is divided by the Ibar River. Kosovo's largest Serbian community lives in North
Mitrovica with a handful of RAE, and across the closely-guarded Mitrovica Bridge is
»
South Mitrovica, populated almost entirely by Kosovar Albanians. Serbs almost never
cross to the south, and Albanians almost never cross to the north, but occasionally
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interethnic violence erupts in the vicinity of the bridge, and as a result, this is the UN and
NATO's most vigilantly monitored location in Kosovo. On 17 March 2004, an incident
involving the (most likely accidental) drowning of two Albanian children in the Ibar near
Mitrovica sparked Albanian-led riots throughout Kosovo that lasted for several days,
leaving many Serbian churches, homes, and cultural sites destroyed. Exactly four years
later, on 17 March 2008, violence again erupted in North Mitrovica, sparked by a dispute
between Kosovar Serbs and UNMIK police that ended with a Ukrainian UNMIK police
officer being struck and killed by Serbian shrapnel, and a Serbian student in a coma,
hospitalized. Kosovo' s declaration of independence triggered these most recent events in
Mitrovica, which have demonstrated the weaknesses ofUNMIK's and NATO's security
structures through their inability to maintain control over northern Kosovo. Furthermore,
during these events, there was no attempt on the part of recently 'independent' Kosovo's
police forces to quell the violence, and this non-response appears likely to remain the
standard. These latest incidences of conflict in Mitrovica have renewed discussion of one
of the alternative proposed solutions to the Kosovo conflict, a de jure partition along the
Ibar.
* * * * *
All of this suggests that Kosovo is not at the ideal stage in its development to be
thrust into full-fledged statehood at this time, and it is therefore not in the best interest of
the international community to foster the creation of a state that, in its present condition,
is likely to founder. To say the least, finding a workable solution for Kosovo that satisfies
demands for self-determination while also respecting sovereignty is exceptionally
complicated. There is no easy response-the international community is limited in its
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options, in that it cannot simply declare that Kosovo is an independent state, nor can it
simply prescribe a full return to Serbian jurisdiction. The complications outlined in this
chapter emphasize how critical the need is for a workable solution to be found, or
created.
Yet the events of 17 February have not met this need. Kosovo's Assembly issued
a unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia, but it remains unclear as to what
this will actually mean for Kosovo and Serbia alike. The UN has adopted an official
position of neutrality, which means that UNMIK has not begun the process of exit from
Kosovo, and so the ED has launched its supervisory mission, EDLEX, in parallel with
UNMIK. Within itself, the ED has been unable to come to a consensus regarding the
issue, and so it remains divided over issues of recognition. Although it will be difficult to
retract the damage caused by an inconsistent international approach to the events of 17
February, it is essential that some mutually acceptable solution is reached. As the
situation stands right now, if Kosovo is allowed to complete its secession from Serbia, it
will have prevented Serbia from being the only truly multiethnic former Yugoslav
republic by triggering further fractures along ethnic lines in the Balkans. Furthermore, the
international community-a third party to the conflict-will have (either through direct
action or passive inaction) carved a piece of territory away from a recognized sovereign
state for the first time in the history of nationalist-separatist conflict. Regardless of SRSG
Rucker's and subsequently ED Enlargement Commissioner alIi Rehn's insistence to the
contrary, 157 this sets an exceptionally dangerous precedent, both for the future of state
157
"Recognition for New Kosovo
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7251359.stm.
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Grows," BBC News. Available at:
expectations of the nature of sovereignty as well as for the ambitions of nationalist-
separatist groups in other corners of the world.
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CHAPTER 4- IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Chapter 3 established that there are numerous complications that arise from
attempts to find a solution to the Kosovo conflict through narrow approaches to self-
determination (that is, either one achieves self-determination through statehood, or one
does not achieve self-determination). Given these complications, the need for a
negotiated settlement that appeases both sides of the conflict should also be readily
apparent. Negotiations did take place over a two-year period between 2005 and 2007, but
they were ultimately unfruitful-though not entirely fruitless. Although the multilateral
status talks failed to reach a mutually agreeable solution to the conflict, they did produce
a great deal of critical thinking on the subject, and this in tum churned out a number of
alternative proposed solutions that, even though they were not adopted during these
negotiations, can serve as fodder for an intellectual debate about why the negotiations
failed, what the negotiators should do for Kosovo, and what these shortcomings and
possible alternatives might mean for other similar conflicts around the world.
Kosovo'S FINAL STATUS NEGOTIATIONS
fo Negotiata - Vetevendosjefl 58
First, let us begin with a brief discussion of why the negotiations failed.
Negotiations began in 2005 and included delegates representing the United States, the
EU, and Russia, in addition to representatives from Serbia and Kosovo. Although
numerous proposals were devised and later rejected, no mutually-agreeable solution was
158 "Jo Negotiata, Vetevendosje!" literally translates to "No negotiation, self-determination!" Spray-painted
and stenciled graffiti featuring this slogan is ubiquitous throughout Albanian regions of Kosovo.
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found, and the talks ended in an official stalemate on 10 December 2007. Beyond the
inherent complications, difficulties, and obstacles inherent to this particular conflict that
were discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the Kosovo final status negotiations failed because
one of the two principal parties refused to negotiate.
The official Kosovar Albanian position is revealed in the slogan, "No negotiation,
self-determination!" This slogan, espoused by Kosovar Albanian organization
Vetevendosje (literally, "self-determination"), summarizes the Kosovar Albanian position
throughout the negotiations process, and as one might imagine, two-party negotiations in
which one party refuses to negotiate are bound to fail. Vetevendosje provides a list of
reasons why 'no negotiation' is an imperative, beginning with "[b]ecause negotiations
make sense when they are held between equal parties. Kosova is not equal to Serbia.
Kosova is not a state as Serbia is.,,159 Again, the notion of sovereign equality resurfaces,
and Vetevendosje's reasoning suggests that equality is the real objective, not sovereignty
or self-determination per se. Thus, despite the insistence of the Kosovar Albanian
position against negotiations, there could have been other ways to meet Vetevendosje's
demands. Unfortunately for all parties involved, the Kosovar Albanians' refusal to
negotiate has ultimately left Kosovo and Serbia in a much worse position than they were
in prior to the negotiations. Beyond this, the negotiations' failure left the international
community uncertain and without a clear direction to follow to foster a resolution to the
conflict. This uncertainty provided the opening through which the Kosovo case made its
159 Vetevendosje!, "Why No Negotiations?" Available at:
http://www.vetevendosie.org/sh/index.php?option=com content&task=view&id=706.
77
break from prior cases of conflict between self-determination movements and
sovereignty.
Alternative Final Status Arrangements
From the outset, both the Serbs' and the Kosovar Albanians' objectives were
clear: the Serbs wanted to hold onto Kosovo territorially and politically (albeit to a
minimum degree-Belgrade was willing to concede broad autonomy to Pristina),
ensuring that the international boundaries of Serbia remained unchanged. In direct
opposition to this, the Kosovar Albanians' aim was nothing less than fully recognized
internal and external sovereignty via independent statehood. The following are some of
the proposed compromises that, for varying reasons, were not accepted but may serve as
future arrangements through which a balance between self-determination and sovereignty
may be struck.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, one proposed solution was to formalize a partition
along the Ibar River in northern KosovO.1 60 Most Kosovar Serbs live above the Ibar, and
so Serbia would retain its ability to govern the majority of its own nationals in Kosovo,
while Kosovar Albanians would be granted independence below the Ibar. This failed for
two main reasons: one, neither the Serbs nor the Kosovar Albanians would agree to
violate the territorial integrity of Kosovo, and two, the Ibar partition would not have
addressed Metohija, which comprises much of Kosovo's western half. This meant that
~
Metohija would have been placed under Albanian control.
160 See Appendix B, Map 2 for an iIlustration of where Kosovo's major ethnic groups reside within
Kosovo.
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A second proposal involved trading land. Serbia would exchange Presevo Valley,
a small area in south Serbia near the border of FYR Macedonia and the administrative
boundary with Kosovo that holds a large number of ethnic Albanians. In return, Serbia
would gain Serb-majority territory in Kosovo-this was essentially akin to a population
exchange. Again, this failed due to staunch resistance from both parties to the notion of
dividing Kosovo. It is interesting to note that both parties are in agreement that Kosovo's
boundaries must not be altered-Serbia does not just want Kosovo's Serbs to remain
under Serbian governance, but also the majority Albanian population of Kosovo.
Likewise, Kosovar Albanians are not demanded a state purged entirely of Serbs-their
objective is an independent Kosovo including North Mitrovica and the Serbian enclaves
under Pristina's jurisdiction.
It is worth noting that there exists a sort of de facto partition in northern Kosovo,
and this has only become more ingrained since Kosovo' s declaration of independence.
The Kosovar Albanians' unilateral action has cemented Serbian solidarity in northern
Kosovo and intensified Kosovar Serbs' resistance to participation in Kosovar government
institutions.
With regard to government institutions, another proposal involved the
arrangement of parallel governments in Belgrade and Pristina, with responsibilities and
powers divided between the two. This proposal did not win support, most likely because
it would have been cumbersome, inefficient, and would require both parties to cede some
amount of what neither is willing to sacrifice-sovereignty.
Later in the process, the discussion turned to notions of shared, pooled, or joint
sovereignty, and this led to one of very few points upon which both the Serbs and
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Kosovar Albanians could agree upon-.a shared belief that a clear European perspective
would be necessary in any arrangement. Both Serbia and Kosovo would like to join the
EU, a common goal that raises this question: if the EU is predicated on an understanding
of 'shared sovereignty' that draws much of its effectiveness from the pooled sovereignty
of its member states, and if both Serbia and Kosovo eventually want to join the EU (and
thus understand that some 'sharing' or 'pooling' of sovereignty will be expected of
them), why not take the first step now-getting on the 'fast track to Europe'-and share
sovereignty with one another once again?
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, this tension between self-determination and sovereignty can only be
reduced if new understandings of what it means to be sovereign, or what it means to have
attained self-determination, are reached. Quoting Lori Damrosch, Patricia Carley argues
that "[s]overeignty does not have to be a zero-sum game," although international law
tends to reinforce the zero-sum approach. 161 The time for this outdated approach has
passed, as organizations such as the EU have demonstrated.
Kosovo presents the ideal test case with which to develop and showcase a newly
balanced model of self-determination's relationship with sovereignty-if a workable
solution to the Kosovo conflict can be achieved that satisfies both the desires of Kosovar
Albanians to attain self-determination, as well as the Serbian desire to maintain its
territorial sovereignty, the international community will have laid the groundwork for
J6J Patricia Carley (United States Institute of Peace), "Self-Determination: Sovereignty, Territorial
Integrity, and the Right to Secession," Report from a Roundtable Held in Conjunction with the us.
Department ofState 's Policy Planning Sta.ff(March 1996), 14.
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solutions to the array of other ongoing nationalist-separatist territorial conflicts that
persist throughout the world. If, however, a workable solution to the Kosovo conflict
cannot be achieved and the international community defaults to its current response,
several negative consequences will follow.
First, the credibility of diplomacy and its usefulness as the preferred tool for
conflict resolution will diminish. This is especially true for internationally-mediated
negotiations, in which the mediators themselves may be perceived as exerting undue
influence in an attempt to secure their own preferred outcome. The aftermath of the failed
negotiations illustrates this, as anti-American sentiment is exceptionally high among
Serbs, and Serbs increasingly are at odds with the EU.
Second, a failure to transition from the post-war international administration of
Kosovo to a mutually-agreeable final status that takes into account the interests of
Serbia-and manages to leave Kosovo in as sustainable a position as possible-will
change the way that intern~tional administrations of the UN, the EU, NATO, and other
intergovernmental organizations (IOGs) are viewed by their hosts. IfUNMIK, KFOR,
and EULEX cannot find an exit from Kosovo on a positive note, any future iteration of
these types of international engagements will be substantially less welcome, can expect
less local cooperation, and therefore will stand a lessened likelihood of success.
Moreover, ifUNMIK, KFOR, and EULEX do exit Kosovo without finding some way to
resolve Kosovo's status, Kosovo will continue to exist in a sort of diplomatic limbo
indefinitely. Two of five permanent members of the UN Security Council (Russia and
China) have refused to recognize Kosovo, making it impossible for Kosovo to gain
membership to the UN or to participate in other international organizations in which
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Russia and China play influential roles. A similar story can be told of the EU-several
EU member states, most notably Spain, have refused to recognize Kosovo, thereby
making ED membership barely a distant hope at this time.
Third, whether this is desirable or not, Kosovo will set a precedent for other
conflicts that bear even slight similarities-and there are many. The list includes the
Quebecois in Canada, the Basques in Spain, the Chechens in Russia, the Kurds in Turkey
and Northern Iraq, the South Ossetians in Georgia, the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh,
the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Tibetans and Taiwanese in China, and others. Upon
declaring independence, Kosovo was offered diplomatic recognition by Northern
(Turkish) Cyprus and was almost immediately congratulated by the Chechens. 162 States
that have refused to recognize Kosovo recognize the risk in acknowledging the
legitimacy of breakaway territories. Despite the fact that each of the aforementioned
groups has been engaged in a struggle for self-determination long prior to Kosovo' s 2008
declaration, it seems reasonable that the perceived success of the Kosovar Albanians'
movement will encourage these related movements. There will be an expectation of
external backing, as groups feel entitled to receive the same international support that has
been afforded to Kosovo by much of Western Europe and the United States.
Finally, most troubling is the likelihood that violent extensions of nationalist-
separatist movements will be able to make an argument that their actions are rightful,
justifiable, or otherwise legitimate, because they are grounded in the quest for self-
determination. This will galvanize the membership oforganizations like the former KLA,
162 "Chechen Rebels Satisfied with Kosovo Proclamation," B92, 18 February 2008. Available at:
http://www.b92.netieng/news/world-article.php?yyyy=2008&mm=02&dd= 18&nav id=47806.
82
the ETA, the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), and others, solidifying the identification
of these members as 'freedom fighters' rather than guerillas or terrorists. If violent tactics
employed on behalf of nationalist-separatist groups are met with international approval or
support (tacit or explicit), this will expand the scope of the conflict rather than help to put
an end to it. Put differently, the interpretation of any right to self-determination should
not be unnecessarily broad. This is admittedly a fine line, as there are occasions when
grassroots armies truly are justified, or when interventions are warranted.
* * * * *
If the bottom line for self-determination really is "the right to be taken seriously,"
as Klabbers suggests, then it stands to reason that there must be some way to ensure that
both the Serbs and the Kosovar Albanians feel that they are being taken seriously, not
only by the international community at large but also by each other. Unilateral
declarations of' independence' coupled with a prolonged international administrative
presence in Kosovo will not foster this respect, but neither will Russian posturing on
behalf of the Serbs, nor an overreliance on long-dead history. The most hopeful solution
to the Kosovo conflict will not be the product of international design, but instead relies on
the goodfaith of the Serbs and the Kosovar Albanians alike to engage in genuine,
constructive negotiations-the solution cannot be imposed or forced by any party; rather,
it must be the joint product of forthright and direct cooperation between both Serbs and
Kosovar Albanians, paired with a willingness to compromise on both sides. Only when
an organic solution is reached can the Kosovo conflict truly reach a point of closure, and
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the only way that such a solution will be achieved is if both parties commit fully to taking
each other's pasts and future seriously.
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ApPENDIX A-
LIST OF COUNTRIES THAT HAVB RECOGNIZED Kosovo 163
As of 24 April 2008, 67 days after Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence, 39
countries have recognized Kosovo as a separate and sovereign republic independent of Serbia. In
order of local date and time of recognition, they are:
I. Costa Rica
2. United States
3. France (EU)
4. Afghanistan
5. Albania
6. Turkey
7. United Kingdom (EU)
8. Australia
9. Senegal
10. Malaysia
II. Germany (EU)
12. Latvia (ED)
13. Denmark (EU)
14. Estonia (ED)
15. Italy (ED)
16. Luxembourg (EU)
17. Peru
18. Belgium (EU)
19. Poland (ED)
20. Switzerland
21. Austria (ED)
22. Ireland (ED)
23. Sweden (ED)
24. The Netherlands (ED)
25. Iceland
26. Slovenia (EU)
27. Finland (ED)
28. Japan
29. Canada
30. Monaco
31. Hungary (ED)
32. Croatia
33. Bulgaria (EU)
34. Liechtenstein
35. Republic of Korea
36. Norway
37. Marshall Islands
38. Nauru
39. Burkina Faso
Of 192 current UN member states, approximately 80% (153) have not yet offered diplomatic
recognition.
163 Source: "Who Recognized
http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/.
Kosova as
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an Independent State?" Available at:
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APPENDIX B- MAPs
MAP 2 - ETHNIC GROUP DISTRIBUTION IN Kosovo AFTER THE Kosovo WAR
Source: http://mondediplo.com/2003/08/IMG/jpglkosovo.jpg.
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